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Abstract 
We are all intimately aware ofwhat is meant by the term consciousness; it is 
something that is at the core of our very being yet it remains a puzzle to many thinkers. 
Relying largely on the work of contemporary philosophers Daniel Dennett and David 
Rosenthal I argue that our current notions of consciousness are rooted in a misguided 
Cartesian tradition. Both philosophers claim to advocate the dissolution of our traditional 
Cartesian notions of consciousness but Rosenthal ultimately fails to fully exorcize his 
Cartesian ghosts. Therefore we must look toward Dennett for a better way to explain 
consciousness. Dennett's multiple drafts model, heterophenomenological method, and 
intentional stance form the basis of his theory of consciousness. Dennett's intentional stance 
provides us with a powerful strategy for interpreting behaviour, since it allows us to attribute 
a mental life to an entity without necessarily attributing consciousness to that same entity. 
Dennett's heterophenomenologcial method is intrinsically linguistic and thus gives us a hint 
as to what is required for consciousness. 
Exploring this linguistic connection to consciousness we notice that language is 
unique to the human mind. As a linking example I will use the case of feral children, 
Kamala and Amala, to illustrate a number of points about consciousness and language. 
Counter-intuitive to our common understanding of language production Dennett argues that 
language is produced unconsciously allowing us to avoid traditional Cartesian ghosts. 
Dennett's theory oflanguage production posits an anti-private language argument and as a 
consequence implies a public arena where language must take place. The main thrust of my 
thesis then argues that language is required for consciousness. On the surface this may also 
seem like a very counter-intuitive claim however language is the only way a third-person 
observer can determine if an entity is conscious and also the only way a first-person 
experiencer can determine if he or she is a conscious entity. 
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Introduction 
There are many stories, fables, and myths of feral (wild or undomesticated) 
children raised by animals in forests and jungles. Feral children are lost or abandoned 
children raised in extreme social isolation, either surviving in the wild through their own 
efforts or by being 'adopted' by animals. Of these numerous myths and legends the story 
of Romulus and Remus is among the most famous. 1 These stories often characterise feral 
children as exhibiting the same animalistic nature ofthe animals that raised them. 
Supposedly these feral children are able to communicate with there animal 'parents' but 
are these children able to develop something more than the ability to signal? These feral 
children do not develop a language in the sense that 'normal' humans develop a language, 
or do they? Are feral children conscious in the same way that we are conscious, or are 
they conscious in a similar way as their animal 'parents'? 
The actual case of the 'Wolf Children ofMidnapore' (India) in the early 1920's 
1 According to Roman legend Romulus and Remus were the twin sons of Mars, 
the god of war, and Rhea Silvia, a vestal virgin. As a vestal virgin Rhea Silvia was 
forbidden to marry and forced to take a sacred vow of chastity. However Mars fell in 
love with Rhea Silvia and she gave birth to twin sons - Romulus and Remus. The infant 
twins were placed in a trough and abandoned by throwing them into the River Tiber. At 
that time the river was flooded and when the waters fell, the trough, still containing the 
two children came ashore under a fig tree. They were discovered by a she-wolf and 
woodpecker who care for them. (The wolf and woodpecker are both sacred animals to 
Mars.) It was some time until the twins were found by the king's shepherd. The 
shepherd and his wife adopted the twins giving them the names, Romulus and Remus. 
After growing up the twins decided to found a city on the spot where they were first 
discovered (Palatine Hill) by the she-wolf. Romulus killed his brother during a battle 
over who should govern. He then named the city after himself (Roma). 
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provides us with an interesting example that can be used as a sounding board in 
attempting to answer these philosophical questions. Two young girls Kamala (about age 
8) and Amala (about 1 Yl) were observed living with wolves near the village ofMidnapore 
in India. When they were discovered, their rescuers actually removed them from the 
embrace of a pair of wolf cubs in order to take them to a local orphanage. Not only did 
they exhibit the physical behaviour of wolves but they displayed physiological 
adaptations, including modifications of the jaw which resulted from chewing on bones. 
In particular Kamala would walk on all fours or creep on her hands and knees, she would 
howl like a wolf, stay active during the night, lap at her food, only eat raw meat, and 
show her teeth and make harsh noises when other children from the orphanage 
approached. The girls were taken to an orphanage where they were cared for and for the 
first time exposed to human society. Amala died within a year of her removal from the 
wild but Kamala lived for 9 years until the age of 17. During her 9 years at the orphanage 
Kamala learned to walk upright, learned to understand verbal instructions, learned to 
speak (she developed a vocabulary of 45 words), and learned to do basic chores and run 
simple errands. Kamala fell ill and died on November 12, 1929, from uraemia (Gesell, 
1942). 
Cases of feral children are ofwidespread interest, notjust because ofthe natural 
curiosity they arouse but also because of what they can teach us about language 
acquisition. When feral children are returned to society, after numerous years in 
isolation, many only acquire a very limited command of language and some continue to 
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remain seriously impaired. In any case these stories and myths (whether real or not) 
provide us with some interesting questions about the nature of language and 
consciousness. 
My thesis, set against the backdrop of the actual case of Kamala and Amala, then 
focuses upon the work of contemporary philosophers Daniel Dennett and David 
Rosenthal. Both Dennett and Rosenthal have been engaged in a debate about the nature 
of consciousness that has lasted for over a decade. This ongoing debate between Dennett 
and Rosenthal has proven to be witty, fascinating, and thought-provoking. When I first 
had the notion to undertake a study comparing the philosophy of Dennett and Rosenthal I 
anticipated that their respective theories on consciousness would complement each other. 
But after close inspection I have discovered that this is not always the case. My thesis 
then adds to this debate by crystallizing some of the ideas that have been produced by 
Dennett and Rosenthal. Throughout my thesis I will pose questions related to the real 
world case ofKamala and Amala while the answers I arrive at will demonstrate the 
linguistic connection to consciousness. In essence I argue that language is required for 
consciousness. 
The Dennett/Rosenthal debate is of significant importance because it confronts 
how we traditionally think about the link between language and consciousness. I am 
advocating a notion of consciousness that is something different then our traditional 
understanding of the term. We cannot equate the existence of a mental life or a mental 
state to the existence of consciousness. To claim that a being has a mental life is only to 
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attribute beliefs and desires to that being but not necessarily consciousness. To attribute 
consciousness then requires something more, namely language. I am advocating a notion 
of language that is a method of communication that involves a syntax, semantics, and a 
pragmatics. Language is then something that is currently the exclusive realm of human 
beings. Both animals and humans can use signals as a method of communication but 
only humans have developed a system of language. 
Dennett agues that we produce language unconsciously. This is a very counter-
intuitive claim but it allows Dennett to avoid such traditional notions as mentalese and 
parroting speech. Dennett further claims that there are no facts of the matter about when 
an object becomes conscious. Dennett goes a long way toward presenting a coherent 
theory of consciousness that avoids traditional Cartesian notions of consciousness. The 
Dennett/Rosenthal debate serves as the avant-garde debate by which to redefine our 
traditional notions of consciousness. Rosenthal attempts to align his theory of 
consciousness with Dennett's theory of consciousness but Dennett does not think this is 
possible. Dennett suspects that Rosenthal has not completely done away with the 
Cartesian notion of a 'central meaner'. For Rosenthal consciousness requires the 
presence of a higher-order thought (HOT), implying that language is not required for 
consciousness. In opposition to Rosenthal I suggest, as I think Dennett does, that 
language is required for consciousness. 
Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery ... There have been other 
great mysteries: the mystery ofthe origin ofthe universe, the mystery of life and 
4 
reproduction, the mystery ofthe design to be found in nature, the mysteries of time, 
space, and gravity . . . We do not yet have the final answers to any of the questions of 
cosmology and particle physics, molecular genetics, and evolutionary theory, but we do 
know how to think about them. The mysteries haven 't vanished, but they have been tamed 
. . . With consciousness, however, we are still in a terrible muddle. Consciousness stands 
alone today as a topic that often leaves even the most sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied 
and confused. 
Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (pp. 21-22) 
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Chapter I - Consciousness 
Death Throes of Cartesian Ghosts 
Traditionally when we think of 'consciousness' we think of being awake or aware 
of one's surroundings and this understanding of consciousness holds true for much of our 
everyday usage. We generally come to realize at some point in our lives that we are 
conscious entities; some people think that I realize it in myself first and then attribute it to 
others while other people hold that it is through my interaction with others that I come to 
recognize that I also am a conscious entity. No matter which way we look at 
consciousness it is something that is so intimate to ourselves that it seems to be part of 
what it is to be a normal human being. Our pre-theoretical intuitions often understand 
consciousness to be something like a personal searchlight. Whatever the searchlight of 
consciousness is aimed at will become illuminated allowing us to claim that we are aware 
or conscious ofthe object or objects being illuminated. We can think of this searchlight 
of consciousness as illuminating objects in the world (in a Husserlian sense) or 
alternatively we can think of this searchlight of consciousness as illuminating objects in 
the mind (in a Cartesian sense). In the Husserlian sense when I aim my searchlight at a 
physical object, such as a table, I am conscious of that physical object. In the Cartesian 
sense when I aim my searchlight at an object in the mind, such as the idea of a table, I am 
conscious of that idea. Our pre-theoretical intuitions also understand consciousness to be 
something like observation with a 'mind's eye'. In much the same way that the 
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searchlight of consciousness directs our attention so too does the mind's eye. In the 
mind's eye analogy consciousness is not directed toward physical objects (since our 
physical eyes would be the vehicle through which we encounter physical objects) but is 
directed towards ideas or objects in the mind. For example if a hypnotist were to ask us 
to picture "a warm sandy beach" he may ask us to picture it in our mind's eye. The role 
of the mind's eye analogy and the searchlight of consciousness analogy are then to stand 
as pre-theoretical ways of explaining consciousness. 
If there is one thinker that has had considerable influence upon our modern day 
understanding of consciousness it would have to be Rene Descartes. Descartes' influence 
upon our everyday thinking about consciousness is not to be underestimated. We 
commonly understand that every human being has a dualistic nature; namely a body and a 
mind. We understand that our bodies and our minds are somehow harnessed together but 
we also believe that after the death of our bodies our minds may continue to exist. Our 
bodies have a public physical nature existing in time and space but our minds do not have 
the same physical nature (we generally understand that our brains, the mass of neurons in 
our skulls, are part of our physical bodies). Rather our minds exist in a private mental 
world. Our understanding of this mental world has become intertwined with our 
understanding of consciousness. Thanks to Descartes, his dualistic notion of human 
nature permeates our everyday thinking about consciousness. 
Dennett and Rosenthal both agree that philosophers should abandon these 
Cartesian notions of consciousness. Dennett argues that we cling too tightly to Cartesian 
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notions of consciousness which saturate not only everyday but even current philosophical 
thinking. What are these Cartesian notions of consciousness as Dennett sees them? The 
Cartesian explanation proposes that there is a point of transition in the material brain 
where consciousness occurs which Descartes suggested could possibly be in the pineal 
gland. The pineal gland, which is smaller than the size of a pea, is located in the middle 
ofthe brain between the right and left hemispheres. The pineal gland is then the part of 
the brain where consciousness all comes together, it acts as the 'finish line for 
consciousness' which Dennett refers to as Cartesian materialism. Dennett (1991a) argues 
that "Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary 
somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the order of 
'presentation' in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of' (p. 
1 07). The imagery of Cartesian materialism is a powerful and well entrenched one. 
Dennett points out that "it's the view you arrive at when you discard Descartes's dualism 
but fail to discard the imagery of a central (but material) theater where it all comes 
together" (p. 1 07). The pineal gland then stands as a candidate for such a Cartesian 
theatre (i.e. the mind's eye). Many philosophers would naturally think that a materialist 
who has done way with dualism could not possibly still be considered a Cartesian. Thus 
Dennett's notion. that non-dualistic materialism could still be Cartesian in nature, seems 
counter-intuitive. However a non-dualistic materialist can still be overpowered by the 
persuasive imagery of a mind's eye or Cartesian screen on which we can witness the final 
defining moment where consciousness occurs. Dennett ultimately disagrees with this 
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Cartesian notion of consciousness claiming that it "keeps coming back to haunt us even 
after its ghostly dualism had been denounced and exorcized" (p. 1 07). 
Rosenthal also advocates the exorcism of Cartesian ghosts but these Cartesian 
ghosts are not the same ghosts that Dennett focuses upon. Rosenthal claims that under 
the Cartesian theory of consciousness all mental states are conscious states; part of what it 
is for a state to be a mental state is that it be conscious. This claim is central to the 
Cartesian concept of mind, and was forcefully articulated by Descartes. In Descartes' 
(1641) Objections and Replies to his Meditations he claims that "we cannot have any 
thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us" (p. 171). 
Descartes is claiming that any thought that we have is necessarily a conscious thought. 
He also points out that the word thought "includes everything that is within us in such a 
way that we are immediately aware of it" (p. 113). Thus for Descartes every mental state 
must be a conscious state. Consciousness then becomes an intrinsic, non-relational 
property of all mental states (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 9). Consciousness is non-relational in 
the sense that mental states are conscious in so far as they are mental, that is, because of 
an essential, internal property. As a result consciousness is the norm and a mental state 
will automatically be a conscious state. The Cartesian theory of mind then presupposes 
consciousness. However, for Rosenthal, it does not take much reflection to realize that 
we can have mental states that are not conscious. For example we can be in a particular 
emotional state (i.e. happiness) and only come to realize this after it is pointed out to us 
by someone else (i.e. "you seem to be in a happy mood today"). Even bodily sensations 
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can go unnoticed and thus exist without being conscious. For example you could be 
participating in an energetic game of ice hockey and receive a minor cut on the chin that 
goes unfelt until the coach points out that you are bleeding. Only after seeing the blood 
on your jersey do you come to realize that you have a pain in your chin. Rosenthal 
claims that if we assume all mental states are conscious states we create a problem of 
circularity because any appeal to mental states is an appeal to conscious states. Rosenthal 
(1990b) argues that "invoking the very phenomenon we want to explain trivializes the 
explanation and prevents it from being informative" (p. 735). Rosenthal maintains that if 
we continue to cling to Cartesian notions of mind the nature of consciousness will remain 
unanalyzable.2 
Rosenthal's Theory of Consciousness 
Rosenthal proposes that we replace these embedded Cartesian notions of 
consciousness with the folk psychological notion of higher-order thoughts (HOT), which 
serves as the foundation for Rosenthal's theory of consciousness. For Rosenthal a mental 
2 Descartes' discussion about the perception of the wax concludes that the mind is 
always better known than anything extended. Thus for Descartes we cannot understand 
our mind, or more specifically our thoughts, in any other terms but themselves (i.e. we 
cannot use our minds without using thoughts) since there is nothing we understand better 
than our own minds. Descartes considers the mind the absolute foundation point for the 
explanation of everything else. Thus for Descartes consciousness must be an intrinsic, 
non-relational property of all mental states. Rosenthal, who is already convinced of a 
relational analysis of consciousness, maintains that this Cartesian view appears circular 
and unanalyzable. 
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state is conscious when it is accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought, where a 
higher-order thought is any thought about a particular mental state. What counts as a 
'thought' for Rosenthal? A 'thought' is assertoric, occurrent, and episodic - essentially a 
transient mental event (distinguished from a 'belief which Rosenthal considers 
dispositional). Dennett (1991a) points out that Rosenthal uses the term 'thought' as a 
technical term "to cover all episodic contentful states, not just episodes that we would 
ordinarily call thoughts" (p. 308). Thus for Rosenthal and Descartes a twinge of pain 
would count as a thought. But unlike Descartes, Rosenthal claims that it is possible that 
we can have mental states that are entirely not conscious. Therefore we must explain 
what it is for a mental state to be conscious by an appeal to a mental state that is not a 
conscious state; this higher-order state itself has the potential to become conscious by an 
appeal to an even higher-order thought. Rosenthal argues that when we think about a 
particular mental state we are conscious of that mental state. For Rosenthal 
consciousness is then a relational property, specifically the property of being 
accompanied by suitable higher-order thoughts. Rosenthal points out that by defining 
consciousness in tenns ofunconscious mental states (i.e. the accompanying suitable 
higher-order thoughts), he has discovered a way of laying the foundations within folk 
psychology for a non-circular, non-mysterious theory of consciousness. 
Rosenthal identifies two types of consciousness: non-introspective consciousness 
and introspective consciousness. Rosenthal refers to a conscious mental state, 
accompanied by a suitable (but itself unconscious) higher-order thought, as a case of non-
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introspective consciousness. Non-introspective consciousness requires no special act of 
attention and as a result non-introspective consciousness has the potential to be an object 
of introspection (Rosenthal, 1990b, p. 730). That is to say it is the conscious mental state 
that has the potential to be an object of introspection. A higher-order thought will not 
itself be a conscious thought unless we also have a third-order thought about the second-
order thought, in which case the third-order thought will not be conscious but the second-
order thought about the mental state will be conscious. This is a case of introspective 
consciousness, where introspective consciousness is the attentive and deliberate focusing 
of consciousness on our mental states (p. 730). When we are introspectively aware of a 
mental state we are also aware of a higher-order thought. Since we are not always 
conscious of our higher-order thoughts introspective consciousness occurs less frequently 
than non-introspective consciousness. 
Rosenthal's theory can be seen as a type oftriplism. Rosenthal's triplism consists 
of unconscious mental states, conscious mental states, and the physical body. A mental 
state, the overall category that conscious and unconscious mental states fit into. will be 
conscious if it is accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought. Rosenthal attempts to 
explain consciousness in terms of higher-order mental states. The appearance of mental 
states does not automatically coincide with their reality, in other words the way that 
mental states appear may not be how they really are. Thus for Rosenthal (1986) non-
consciousness is more basic than consciousness (pp. 17-18). Rosenthal's higher-order 
thought theory preserves a methodological neutrality with respect to the apparent 
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opposition between first-person and third-person viewpoints (Rosenthal, 1995, p. 366). 
Rosenthal claims that his higher-order thought theory, although \Veaker, yields the same 
results as Dennett's theory of consciousness (p. 360). 
Dennett's Theory of Consciousness 
Like Rosenthal, Dennett examines the same two concepts, 'consciousness' and 
'mental' but he approaches the distinction in quite a different manner. Dennett examines 
'consciousness' using his multiple drafts model while he examines what counts as 
'mental' by using his intentional stance (which will be discussed in the next section). 
Dennett then submits that we should replace the entrenched Cartesian notion of 
consciousness with a multiple drafts model (MDM), which he believes will ultimately 
provide us with a better model for understanding consciousness. The multiple drafts 
model claims that "all thought or mental activity is accomplished in the brain by parallel, 
multi-track processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs" (Dennett 1991a, 
p. 111 ). There is no Cartesian theater or 'mind's eye' (i.e. a central meaner or observer in 
the brain) that is the finish line for consciousness. In fact there is no finish line for 
consciousness at all; there is only a continuous editorial revision of sensory input. If one 
wanted to settle on a particular moment of processing in the brain as the moment of 
consciousness, it would be purely arbitrary. The multiple drafts model affirms that not all 
mental states are conscious states and thus consciousness is not an intrinsic property of all 
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mental states. For Dennett consciousness is discontinuous, anomalous, and gappy (i.e. to 
a third-person observer) even though it may appear to be continuous, stable, and single 
(i.e. to the first-person experiencer). The folk psychological or common use of the word 
'consciousness' is often ambiguous and often intertwined with our general understanding 
of the word 'mental' therefore I am using the word 'consciousness' to mean the content 
of my personal heterophenomenological reports. 3 
What is Dennett's heterophenomenology? Heterophenomenology refers to 
Dennett's philosophical method of discovery which has its roots in Edmund Husserl's 
phenomenology. Husserl's phenomenology is an investigative method that is concerned 
with the description of objects of human experience or phenomena. Dennett refers for 
Husserl's phenomenology as autophenomenology, where the prefix 'auto' refers to 
'describing one's own experience'. Dennett's problem with phenomenology is that it is 
undertaken by oneself so Dennett developed heterophenomenology, where the prefix 
'hetero' refers to 'describing another's experience'. Thus Dennett's 
heterophenomenology refers to an account of objects of human experience which is 
undertaken by another. A heterophenomenologist will seek to interpret how things will 
seem to someone given their behaviour. Dennett claims that his heterophenomenological 
method is the appropriate method by which to study consciousness. For example 
consider the case of a third-person observer who interprets the language of a first-person 
3 Special thanks to Don Ross (University of Cape Town, South Africa) for 
drawing my attention to this discrimination. 
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experiencer witnessing a sunset. A first-person experiencer claims that she is witnessing 
a 'red' sunset (we assume that she is reporting honestly). Even if the same sunset appears 
'orange' to the third-person observer he must attribute the belief of 'witnessing a red 
sunset' to the first-person experiencer. The third-person observer cannot experience the 
same sunset that the first-person experiencer does. Dennett's heterophenomenological 
method requires data from the third-person observer in order for us to attribute beliefs and 
desires to that first-person experiencer. It is the process of interpreting a speaker's 
language that reveals how things seem to that speaker. Dennett's (199la) 
heterophenomenological method then "neither challenges nor accepts as entirely true the 
assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in 
the hope of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subjects" (p. 
83). Dennett's method is a way of interpreting behaviour and remaining neutral with 
respect to the apparent opposition between first-person and third-person perspectives. 
Dennett's method involves the interpretation of the language we generate as speakers, the 
way things seem to us, or the content of the stories we tell (i.e. our 
heterophenomenological worlds). Since Dennett's method relies upon the interpretation 
of the language of first-person experiencers than the heterophenomenological method 
appears to be intrinsically linguistic. 
Dennett provides us with an analogy to help better understand his 
heterophenomenological method. Dennett (1991a) claims that "[w]e can compare the 
heterophenomenologist's task of interpreting subjects' behavior to the reader's task of 
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interpreting a work of fiction" (p. 79). A work of fiction tells a story but not a true story 
yet we often speak of what is true in the story. Consider the example of Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle writing about Sherlock Holmes. If Conan Doyle writes that Sherlock Holmes 
catches a train that departs from Waterloo Train Station at 11 : 10 am then that is what is 
true in the story. The fact that Sherlock Holmes catches the 11:10 out of Waterloo cannot 
be challenged; the content of the story is only what the author tells us about. Thus if a 
first-person experiencer witnesses a 'red sunset' than the content of that report cannot be 
challenged; it is what is true in the story of the first-person experiencer. 
Let us now consider what would happen if we asked the feral child Kamala, upon 
her removal from the wild, to describe her heterophenomenological world. It is 
immediately clear that Kamala would not be able to respond to our questions since she 
had not developed an understanding ofhuman language. We now notice an important 
fact about our heterophenomenological investigation: "[p ]eople are the only objects of 
scientific study the preparation of which typically (but not always) involves verbal 
communication" (Dennett, 1991a, p. 73). Since Kamala has yet to learn a language she 
cannot describe the contents of her heterophenomenological world. However we can still 
treat Kamala as a rational agent that has beliefs and desires if we adopt the intentional 
stance (which will be discussed in the next section). 
Dennett's theory of consciousness can be seen as a type of dualism but this is not 
the dualism of Descartes, rather Dennett's dualism is that of content and vehicle. The 
content is about the reports of our heterophenomenological world while the vehicle refers 
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to the material brain (i.e. the neurons, synapse, and chemical process in our brains). 
Dennett (1991a) claims that "we can distinguish representing from represented, vehicle 
from content" (p. 131 ). Dennett attempts to illustrate this content-vehicle distinction by 
referring to the Battle ofNew Orleans which occurred on January 8, 1815, fifteen days 
after the truce ending the War of 1812. Without the aid of a high-tech communication 
system letters, intended to be delivered worldwide, would be sent and received at various 
times. It is reasonable to believe that an individual in India may receive a letter about the 
Battle of New Orleans prior to receiving a letter about the end ofthe war. To our 
observer in India the Battle of New Orleans 'seems' to have occurred prior to the signing 
of the treaty in Belgium. The ingenious idea of placing the date (or postmark) on the 
letters allows our observer to place these letters in chronological order. Thus the vehicle 
can be likened to the physical letters themselves while the content can be likened to 
reports about the dated substance of those letters. Dennett points out that "(t]his 
distinction between time represented (by the postmark) and time of representing (the day 
the letter arrives) is an instance of the familiar distinction between content and vehicle" 
(p. 147). The content-vehicle distinction is important to Dennett's overall theory of 
consciousness because "the representation of time in the brain does not always use time-
in-the-brain" (p. 131). There is no Cartesian screen or finish line for consciousness where 
a central observer or mind's eye witnesses the arrival of various messages into the brain. 
Consider the example of the sentence 'Billy and Sally arrived at the party together, but 
Jane arrived before both ofthem.' In the sequence ofthe sentence the names Billy and 
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Sally occur prior to the name Jane but we understand that Jane actually arrived at the 
party before Billy and Sally despite the fact that we read the names Billy and Sally first. 
The order of the appearance of the names Billy, Sally, and Jane is irrelevant to the content 
of the information reported. Therefore the role of time is significant since the 
chronological order of appearance is not what matters but rather the temporal order of the 
content of the information reported is what really matters. 
Dennett's dualism is then very different from both Descartes dualism and 
Rosenthal's triplism. Dennett's content-vehicle distinction consists of the content of our 
personal heterophenomenological reports and the vehicle through which the content is 
produced. Descartes mind-body dualism consists of a mental life and a physical body. 
Rosenthal's triplism also consists of a mental life (conscious and unconscious mental 
states) and a physical body. In fact, Rosenthal's triplism appears to be very similar to 
Descartes dualism. Both acknowledge a physical body and some type of mental life. 
However Rosenthal considers consciousness to be a relational property while Descartes 
considers a mental life to be an intrinsic property. Unlike Descartes, Rosenthal and 
Dennett both distinguish between mental states which are conscious and mental states 
which are not conscious. The following section will explore what Dennett considers to 
be a mental life. 
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Dennett's Intentional Stance 
In order to fully grasp Dennett's theory of consciousness we must understand 
what counts as a 'mental life' for Dennett. Consciousness is something more than our 
traditional Cartesian understanding of a mental life (or mental state, mental world, mental 
experience, mental reality, intelligence, mind, etc.). We can understand what counts as a 
mental life for Dennett in terms ofhis 'intentional stance'. We have mentioned that for 
Descartes a mental life is intrinsically the same as consciousness, and that for Rosenthal 
consciousness is a relational property, but what does Dennett mean by the term 'mental 
life'? I suggest that by 'mental life' Dennett means something like, 'what the intentional 
stance refers to'. But in order to understand this, we must first examine in some detail 
what Dennett means by his intentional stance. Dennett claims that a 'stance' is a strategy 
for interpreting the behaviour of an entity and that by adopting one of three stances we 
can explain an entity's behaviour. Dennett's three stances include: the physical stance, 
the design (or functional) stance, and the intentional stance. 
The intentional stance, as proposed by Dennett, is a strategy or method for 
understanding an entity's behaviour. The intentional stance is a method of explaining 
and predicting an entity or system's behaviour by treating it as having goals and some 
capacity to achieve its goals. If we adopt the intentional stance we interpret the behaviour 
of an entity by treating it as a rational agent whose actions are governed by beliefs and 
desires (i.e. mental life). Dennett (1991a) claims that ''we must treat the noise-emitter as 
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an agent, indeed a rational agent, who harbors beliefs and desires and other mental states 
that exhibit intentionality or 'aboutness', and whose actions can be explained (or 
predicted) on the basis of the content of these states" (p. 76). As a consequence of 
Dennett's intentional stance we can attribute beliefs and desires to a entity without 
necessarily attributing consciousness to that same entity. Dennett's intentional stance 
then plays an important role in understanding what stands as a mental life and in 
developing an understanding of his theory of consciousness. Even though the intentional 
stance is an important component of Dennett's theory of consciousness its purpose is 
merely to act as an explanatory schema. We must also consider the physical and design 
stances as explanatory schema. 
The physical stance comes from the perspective of the physical sciences. Under 
the physical stance we use information about an entity's physical make-up in conjunction 
with the laws of physics to predict future behaviour. For example when we make 
predictions about the movement of planets, comets, and stars we require a knov.:ledge of 
their make-up and an understanding of the laws of physics. These types of predictions 
often rely upon a knowledge of the law of gravity and the fact that the planets. comets. 
and stars have weight and mass. Predictions made using the physical stance are fairly 
common and provide us with great detail however if we were to describe all things using 
the physical stance the process of explanation would be extremely complex. For example 
when a ice hockey referee releases a hockey puck from his hand during a face-off. we 
know that it will drop to the ice. To describe 'a puck dropping to the ice· using the 
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physical stance would require a comprehensive knowledge of physics and gravitational 
forces that would be so detailed that sports play-by-play announcers would be unable to 
call the game effectively. Therefore we should reserve use of the physical stance when 
describing things that involve an understanding of an immense amount of detail like the 
movement of heavenly bodies, the behaviour of quantum particles, and the process of 
chemical reactions, just to name a few. 
The design (or functional) stance, on the other hand, is used to predict the 
behaviour of an entity by understanding the program controlling its operations. The 
design stance assumes that an entity has been designed in a particular way and we predict 
that the entity will behave as designed. The design stance will produce an explanation 
that is much simpler than an explanation produced by the physical stance. For our 
predictions to have any value under the design stance a system or entity must function as 
it has been programmed to function and we must assume this to be true or the design 
stance will prove fruitless. Due to this assumption explanations using the design stance 
are less secure than explanations using the physical stance. 
The difference between the physical stance and the design stance can be 
illustrated by considering complicated objects such as cars or computers. Every time we 
start a car we predict that inserting and turning the appropriate key in the ignition will 
start the car's engine. We normally make this prediction using the design stance, that is 
we predict that the engine will start because that is the way the car has been designed to 
function. If we were to make predictions using the physical stance we would have to 
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possess a knowledge of all the physical laws governing the engine in order to describe the 
workings of a car. The fact that it may be easier for us to apply the design stance to a car 
does not mean that we cannot also apply the physical stance to it. In most cases when we 
are dealing with a designed object adopting the physical stance is hardly worth the long-
winded effort. We may wish to adopt a physical stance description of our car in order to 
predict its behaviour in case of a malfunction or problem with the car. Dennett ( 1996) 
argues that "[ d]esign-stance prediction, when applicable, is a low-cost, low-risk shortcut, 
enabling me to finesse the tedious application of my limited knowledge of physics" (p. 
29). The design stance can even be employed when attempting to predict the behaviour 
of biological entities. The design stance can predict that a heart will pump blood, thereby 
doing what hearts are supposed to do (i.e. the way nature designed them to behave). 
Dennett claims that we can often improve our predictions by adopting the 
intentional stance. Remember that intentional states are mental states such as beliefs and 
desires which have the property of 'aboutness'. Intentional states are about, or directed 
at objects or states of affairs in the world. Following the intentional stance is generally a 
four step process: first we must decide to treat an object X as a rational agent; second we 
must determine what beliefs X ought to have, given its place and purpose in the world: 
third we must determine what desires X ought to have. given its place and purpose in the 
world; and fourth on the assumption that X will act to satisfy some of its desires in light 
of its beliefs, we can predict what X will do. The intentional stance has the advantage of 
greater simplicity than the design and physical stances but due to this simplicity the 
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intentional stance has a greater degree of risk. The intentional stance buys its simplicity 
at the cost of accepting assumptions that it can treat a system or entity as having a degree 
of rationality. 
Using Dennett's example of a chess-playing computer we can further illustrate 
what the physical, design, and intentional stances have to say. The chess-playing 
computer as a physical system operates according to the laws of physics, the laws of 
electronics, etc. The chess-playing computer as a design system operates as a designed 
mechanism consisting of parts with specific functions that interact to produce certain 
characteristic behaviour. To treat a chess-playing computer as an intentional system is to 
treat it as acting rationally in order to attribute a certain set of beliefs and goals to it. 
Dennett claims that adopting the intentional stance is the most efficient and most 
powerful way to predict and explain what a chess-playing computer will do. He points 
out that there are hundreds of different programs that could tum a single computer into a 
chess-playing computer and there are hundreds of differently designed computers that 
could run a single chess-playing program. When we adopt the intentional stance we do 
not have to worry about the various physical components of the computer or the 
programming language used to run the chess-playing program. Once we treat the chess-
playing computer as a rational agent with beliefs about the rules and strategies. with the 
desire to win, we can predict that it will make the best move available to it (Dennett, 
1996. p. 30). In essence by adopting the intentional stance we are treating the chess-
playing computer as having a 'mental life'. 
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However the intentional stance may not be the most appropriate method of 
describing behaviour if something goes wrong with the computer or the program. If the 
computer suddenly began to act in a manner inconsistent with the actions of a reasonable 
chess player we would have to adopt the design stance. We may then have to examine a 
particular section of programing in order to accurately predict the behaviour of the 
computer. If the computer were to suddenly freeze-up or crash we may have to adopt the 
physical stance. We may then have to revert to thinking of the computer as a physical 
object in order to adequately explain its behaviour. However, Dennett claims that we 
should generally treat the chess-playing computer as a rational agent that will act on its 
beliefs in order to achieve its desires. 
Dennett's intentional stance allows us to attribute beliefs to an entity but are these 
beliefs real? Dennett provides us with an analogy - beliefs are like centers of gravity. 
There are those who consider centers of gravity to be fictions and there are those who 
consider centers of gravity to be perfectly real. Centers of gravity are fictions insofar as 
they are merely abstract points of reference and centers of gravity are real insofar as they 
are the resultant force (i.e. a vector sum) acting through a central point. Dennett (1991 b) 
defines centers of gravity as "mathematical points (i.e. abstract points) definable in terms 
of physical forces and other properties" (p. 96). Dennett argues that the question of 
whether abstract objects are real (i.e. the question of whether or not one should be a 
realist about them) can take two routes: the metaphysical or the scientific. The 
metaphysical route is concerned with the existence of abstract objects generally, and does 
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not distinguish them in terms of scientific utility. The scientific route is concerned with 
the reality of abstract objects particularly, as they do have scientific value or utility. 
Dennett argues that beliefs like "abstract objects have the same metaphysical status as 
centers of gravity" (p. 97). He points out that we should be interested in the scientific 
path to realism where centers of gravity are real because they are good abstract objects (p. 
97). Thus Dennett adopts a mild realist approach toward beliefs by claiming they are 
semi-real or good abstract objects. Dennett does not indicate what he means by the term 
'good' but I suspect that we could replace it with the term 'useful'. Centres of gravity are 
then useful abstract objects because they provide us with some form of scientific value or 
utility. 
On the surface Dennett's intentional stance may seem very much like folk 
psychology. In fact Dennett (1991b) claims that we use folk psychology as a method of 
"interpretation of each other as believers, wanters, intenders, and the like - to predict what 
people will do next. Folk psychology helps us understand and empathize with others, 
organize our memories, interpret our emotions, and flavor our vision in a thousand ways, 
but at the heart of all this is the enormous predictive leverage of folk psychology" (pp. 
97-98). In this sense folk psychology is very similar to the intentional stance but there is 
however one minor difference. The intentional stance can treat all entities as having 
beliefs and desires (even computers, cars, and thermostats) while folk psychology only 
treats humans and animals as having beliefs and desires. Folk psychology is then the 
'common sense' theory that treats humans and animals as entities that have beliefs and 
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desires in order to predict their behaviour. Even though we can use the intentional stance 
to treat all entities as having beliefs and desires, Dennett argues that we should be 
pragmatic about its use. Thus the intentional stance is also a 'common sense' way of 
interpreting behaviour with an added degree of flexibility that folk psychology does not 
necessarily have. Therefore we must use whatever stance gives us the easiest and most 
reliable predictions. Dennett claims that "our power to interpret the actions of others 
depends on our power to predict them" (p. 98). 
Dennett's intentional stance plays an important role in understanding what counts 
as a mental life and in developing an understanding of his theory of consciousness. The 
intentional stance then provides us with a powerful tool for not only predicting behaviour 
but also for attributing mental states (i.e. beliefs and desires). Consider the case of 
Kamala and Amala. Using Dennett's intentional stance we can treat Kamala and Amala 
as rational agents and interpret their behaviour as being motivated by beliefs and desires. 
When Kamala and Amala were removed from the wild they could not speak or 
understand any language yet they were still treated as having a mental life. For example 
if we adopt the intentional stance we can attribute the mental state of 'hunger' to Kamala 
and Amala if we observe them eagerly eating raw meat. However our adoption ofthe 
intentional stance alone does not mean that Kamala and Amala are necessarily conscious 
beings. Using the intentional stance we can separate out from our folk psychological 
understanding of consciousness what Dennett refers to as a mental state. Attributing 
consciousness to an entity is not the same as attributing a mental life to an entity. Thus 
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for Dennett the claim that an entity has a mental state only amounts to a strategy of 
attributing beliefs and desires. For Rosenthal the claim that an entity has a mental state 
amounts to that entity having a particular relational thought (that particular thought can 
be conscious or unconscious). For Rosenthal a mental state is consciousness if it 
accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought; for Dennett consciousness amounts to 
something different than what Rosenthal's folk psychology advocates. 
Both Dennett and Rosenthal's theories of consciousness represent an improved 
alternative to our traditional Cartesian understanding of consciousness. Rosenthal and 
Dennett have moved beyond Descartes by dispelling such traditional notions of a mind's 
eye and a searchlight of consciousness. Consequently there can be no Cartesian theatre 
where consciousness comes together. I agree with both Rosenthal and Dennett in their 
attempts to dispel these Cartesian ghosts. However we must focus upon Dennett's theory 
of consciousness if we are to arrive at a better way of explaining consciousness. Since 
Dennett's heterophenomenological method is intrinsically linguistic, consciousness must 
somehow be related to language. An entity need not have the ability to use language in 
order to be attributed with a mental life (as in the case of Kamala and Amala). However 
before we can attribute consciousness to an entity more must be said about the nature of 
language. In the coming chapter we will explore the notion of language in some detail. 
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Chapter 1 
In this chapter we saw how both Dennett and Rosenthal advocate the dissolution of 
traditional Cartesian notions of consciousness. This chapter explored Rosenthal's theory 
of consciousness and how he believes that his higher-order thought theory is a better 
alternative to any Cartesian notion of consciousness. This chapter also explored 
Dennett's theory of consciousness, focusing upon his multiple drafts model, 
heterophenomenological method, and intentional stance. Dennett also believes that his 
theory of consciousness is better than our traditional Cartesian notions of consciousness. 
While Rosenthal's theory clings to our common or folk psychological understanding of 
consciousness, Dennett's theory takes us in a completely new direction. Dennett's 
intentional stance provides us with a powerful strategy for interpreting behaviour. This 
allows us to attribute a menta/life to an entity without necessariZv attributing 
consciousness to that same entity. Dennett's heterophenomenologcial method then 
requires us to explore further a linguistic connection to consciousness. 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter will focus upon language. In particular I will make a distinction 
between two methods of communication: language and signalling. Language is unique to 
the human mind whereas signalling is available as a method of communication lo both 
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humans and animals. I will examine Dennett's 'pandemonium model' of language 
production and Rosenthal's 'refinement model' of language production. Dennett's 
pandemonium model claims that language is produced unconsciously, which conflicts 
with Rosenthal's folk psychological notions of language production. I will argue that 
Rosenthal unsucces~fully attempts to combine his folk psychology with Dennett's 
pandemonium model. I will argue that Dennett's pandemonium model posits an anti-
private language argument and as a consequence requires a public arena where 
language must take place. 
29 
Chapter 2 - Language 
Language and Signalling 
In our everyday lives we often do not think too much about language but its 
importance cannot be overestimated. Language is a central part of what it is to be a 
human being. All normal human beings use language, while non-human animals do not, 
thus possessing a language is a primary human trait. Language is the main vehicle by 
which we know about other people's thoughts. Every time we speak we are revealing 
something about ourselves and the language we use. We commonly understand language 
to mean our speech, or the words we use to communicate with other people. We 
commonly understand communication to be the act of giving or passing along 
information. Language is then a method of communication. However language is not the 
only method of communication, signalling is another. I will first examine what I mean by 
the term 'language'. 
Language is a method of communication that is unique to normal human beings. 
Language requires the use and understanding of symbols and characters that represent 
certain objects. Language involves a combination of rules in which these symbols and 
characters are immersed into an unlimited set of combinations, each with a determinate 
meaning. Language can be written and/or spoken but either way one must posses a 
general understanding of the rules that govern language before one can participate. We 
now can understand language as having syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The syntax of 
30 
a language consists of the lexicon (i.e. words) of a language and its grammatical or 
syntactical rules. The words are concatenated according to the grammatical rules in order 
to produce sentences. The semantics of a language has to do with the meanings 
expressed by words and sentences. In particular the semantics of a language tell us what 
meanings are assigned to individual words and how these meanings combine to provide 
the meanings of whole sentences. Pragmatics has to do with the utterances of sentences 
in social contexts. Whereas the hope in semantics is that a sentence can be regarded as 
having a proposition paired with it in isolation from context, when we tum our attention 
to pragmatics we consider the bearing of the circumstances under which it is uttered on 
what meaning is ultimately expressed. Sarcastic or ironic uses of language are good 
examples of what can be considered pragmatic phenomena. The structure of language 
then provides us with a variety of publicly accessible rules that must be followed which 
lets us know if we are using language correctly. Human beings have the ability to 
represent themselves and their thoughts using language. Language then entails the ability 
to reflect upon our thoughts. 
Normal human beings may communicate by using language but what about non-
human animals? It may seem obvious to us that animals have a 'language' since we 
observe animals 'talking' all the time. We commonly understand that the barks. growls, 
and whimpers of dogs represent certain things to other dogs and it is these verbal 
utterances that amount to a 'language' for dogs. Animals can 'talk' to one another 
through a variety of means; for example, a beaver will slap its tail against the surface of 
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the water as a warning signal to other beavers that danger is approaching. It may be true 
that we interpret the bark of a dog or the slap of a beaver tail as having the purpose of 
passing along infom1ation but these actions do not amount to a language. The bark of a 
dog and the slap of a beaver tail do not meet the criteria for language. A language will 
have a syntax, semantics, and a pragmatics while the bark of a dog or the slap of a beaver 
tail may have a semantics (and possibly even a pragmatics) but they will not have a 
syntax. Thus animals can only communicate by way of 'signalling'. Signalling is a 
method of communication that lacks syntax (i.e. words and grammatical rules); signals 
have a semantics without a syntax. The main point of signalling is that each signal is 
independent of other signals; that is, they do not form part of a system. Knowing one 
signal does not help us to know another signal, whereas knowing one sentence in 
language places us in a much better position to understand another sentence. For 
example if we know 'the cat is on the mat' then we can figure out 'the dog is on the chair' 
fairly easily. If we know that dropping a handkerchief signals the start of a race we are 
no closer to figuring out that a shot fired from a gun signals that the race has been won. 
Normal human beings have the ability to both signal and to use language whereas 
animals only have the ability to signal. Signalling is then the activity of passing along 
particular information which can be accomplished either verbally or non-verbally. 
Human beings can use language as a method to communicate and can also use some form 
of signalling (i.e. body 'language') as a method to communicate. Normal human beings 
have the potential to use language and until they actually begin to speak and understand 
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what they and others are saying then they can only signal their intentions. Successful 
acquisition of language typically happens by the time a normal child reaches the age of 
four or five. 4 Language then involves some mental capacity that animals do not possess. 
Consider the case of Kamala and Amala and their development toward language. Kamala 
and Amala, by virtue of being humans, certainly had the potential to develop language. 
Unfortunately Amala died at the age of 2 and did not develop a language. Since animals 
communicate by signalling it is estimated during the seven years Kamala spent living 
with the wolves she learned to exhibit many wolf-like signals. When Kamala was 
discovered in the wild and brought to an orphanage at the age of eight she had not 
developed a language but she had developed the ability to howl and cry like a wolf. By 
the time an average ~orth America child has reached the age of eight he will have 
developed a vocabulary of over 3000 words, whereas the time Kamala was eight she 
exhibited absolutely no human articulation (Gesell, 1942, p. 60). It is fair to say then that 
Kamala's only method for communicating was through wolf-like signalling. Thus we 
can now attribute to the verbal howls and cries ofKamala meanings (or semantics) and 
beliefs (via the intentional stance, as mentioned in Chapter 1) but not necessarily 
4 Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (2003) argues that there may be a 
neurologically-determined 'critical period' for successful language acquisition. 
"Synapses continue to develop, peaking in number between nine months and two years 
(depending on the brain region), at which point the child has 50% more synapses than the 
adult. Metabolic activity in the brain reaches adult le\·els by nine to ten months, and soon 
exceeds it, peaking around the age of four. In addition, huge numbers of neurons die in 
utero, and the dying continues during the first two years before levelling off at age seven. 
Synapses wither from the age of two through the rest of childhood and into adolescence, 
when the brain's metabolic rate falls back to adult levels" (Language Acquisition). 
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consciousness. This is one ofthe central claims of this thesis that for an individual to 
have consciousness, as opposed to just beliefs and desires, signalling alone is insufficient; 
syntactical language is necessary. 
We have just discussed the differences between language and signalling but what 
exactly counts as a language? We can identify two types oflanguages: natural and 
artificial. A natural language is a language that has evolved naturally whereas an 
artificial language is a language that has been constructed. We can classify English, 
French, and Latin, as natural languages while we can classify computer code, 
mathematics, and logic as artificial languages. Ifwe were to construct an artificial 
language we would need to specify a lexicon, the rules of construction, and a semantics. 
In constructing an artificial language we would not necessarily need to specify a 
pragmatics. A typical feature of any type of language is that it can be translated into 
another language. For example we can translate an old Latin text into French, we can 
translate a proposition of logic into German, and we can translate the English rules of 
chess into computer code. When we translate from one language to another we attempt to 
preserve the meaning of what is translated. For example the English sentence 'It's 
raining' can be translated into the French sentence 'II pleut'. However some languages 
are much more expressive than others and this can lead to problems in translation. Unless 
otherwise specified when I refer to a language I will be referring to a natural language. 
There is another type of language that needs clarification: mentalese. Mentalese 
is a term coined by Jerry Fodor (1975) from his work The Language of Thought which 
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claims that all mental representations are linguistic expressions within an 'internal' 
language which significantly resembles spoken language. Mentalese or a language of 
thought (LOT) is postulated to be encoded in the brains of intelligent creatures in order to 
be used as a vehicle or medium from which all cognition proceeds. Mentalese is not only 
embedded in our brains but even in intelligent non-human animals that are incapable of 
speaking any language at all (i.e. chimpanzees). The main function ofmentalese is to be 
a medium of representation for thought; an essential feature of mentalese is that it has a 
language-like structure (Fodor, 1975, pp. 99-103). Fodor suggests that mentalese 
resembles a natural language but there is some debate over whether mentalese (if it exists 
at all) really resembles a natural language. Dennett does not support the idea of 
mentalese; Dennett's intentional stance (discussed in Chapter 1) stands as an alternative 
to Fodor's position. For Dennett a belief is always specified or made determinate and so 
requires a natural language. When we attribute a belief to a dog the determination is due 
to our language and the belief is semi-real (i.e. much like a centre of gravity). Fodor 
deals with the same issue exactly but takes an industrial strength realist approach; beliefs 
are real things sitting inside an organism, regardless of stance. Hence beliefs must have 
their own structure (independent of stances) and that structure is the same as that of 
linguistic propositions. Thus for Fodor a belief is really in the organism itself, and so 
mentalese has to be invented to give a beliefthe specific linguistic structure that it has. 
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Pandemonium Model 
How does a natural language get produced? Are our brains really encoded with 
some type ofmentalese or is there another alternative? What do our pre-theoretical 
intuitions tell us? Our pre-theoretical intuitions tells us that the words we use are 
assembled into a language (i.e. English) prior to their verbal sounding. Various 
components of our brains work together assembling letters into words and words into 
sentences. The entire project is overseen by a central director or central part of the brain 
that ensures what is said is what was intended. Thus prior to the occurrence of a verbal 
expression their exists within us a corresponding determinate intentional state (i.e. I am 
hungry). It is the determinate intentional state that governs what we say. For example I 
have the thought 'I am hungry' prior the verbal expression of that thought in a natural 
language. Thus the content of our thoughts (or intentional states) fix our speech acts. It 
then seems plausible that our brains are indeed encoded with some type ofmentalese 
which precedes natural language. 
Dennett challenges the above pre-theoretical view by characterizing two models 
of language production: the bureaucracy model and the pandemonium model. Dennett 
calls the everyday view 'bureaucratic' and considers it to be based on the Cartesian 
approach which, as we saw in Chapter 1, he wishes to move beyond. Dennett 
characterizes the bureaucracy model as proposing a hierarchy of message generation 
while advocating a central meaner (or conceptualizer) who is responsible for message 
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discrimination. It is the central meaner that decides which messages are verbalized and 
which are not. The bureaucracy model then essentially matches our pre-theoretical 
intuitions of language production. The bureaucratic or pre-theoretical way of explaining 
the origination of our intentions presupposes that they already exist in us before our brain 
has to translate them. If intentional states originate in our brain prior to their 
verbalization in speech, then there has to be some way in which the brain moves from not 
having intentional states to the production of language. The Cartesian assumption of a 
central meaner, and Fodor's notion ofmentalese, presuppose that there is already a 
preformed intentional state, but it is precisely the origination of meaning that Dennett's 
theory is seeking to explain. Dennett claims that his pandemonium model explains this 
origination and consequently we should discard the bureaucracy model in favour of the 
pandemonium model. The pandemonium model of language production is then the 
proper alternative to our bureaucratic or pre-theoretical intuitions of language production. 
Dennett's pandemonium model stands in opposition to the bureaucracy model of 
language production. The pandemonium model. as the name suggests, proposes 
serendipitous activity by various word-demons. These word-demons work in multiple 
parallel fashion, feverishly constructing numerous possible expressions. The 
pandemonium model does not require a central meaner or some type of mentalese. 
Dennett (1991a) claims that "control is usurped rather than delegated, in a process that is 
largely undesigned and opportunistic" (p. 241 ). Phrases that get expressed (i.e. the words 
that are put forth by various competing word-demons) are the ones that are in the right 
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place at the right time. Dennett claims that "the speaker gets no preview; he and his 
audience learn what the speaker's utterance is at the same time" (p. 238). Dennett often 
quotes E.M. Foster to demonstrate his point; "How do I know what I think until I see 
what I say?" Our intentional expressions are performed without any conscious preamble. 
Given this unconscious notion of language production we are often satisfied by what we 
say; it is normally coherent and rational. In fact it often seems that putting our thoughts 
into word helps clarify our thinking but this is not the result of us first having a clearer 
thought because, according to Dennett it is our speech acts that fix the content of our 
thoughts (or intentional states). For Dennett there is no determinate intentional states 
prior to the occurrence of verbal expressions. Thus it is our speech acts that fix the 
content of our thoughts. 
An advantage of the pandemonium model is that it allows Dennett to provide us 
with an explanation ofFreudian slips. Dennett argues that slips ofthe tongue only occur 
with words that are similar in sound or structure. For example we would not normally 
say 'carrot' in place of 'God', however we may mistakenly say 'God' in place of 'dog' or 
'curse' in place of 'course'. These similar words mistakenly get expressed because there 
is a "mismatch distance in semantic space" this error occurs between "the content that is 
in a position to be expressed and the various candidates for verbal expression that are 
initially nominated" (Dennett, 1991a, p. 247). 
Critics ofDennett's pandemonium model claim that he is advocating nothing 
more than 'parroting' speech. If there is no thought behind our speech acts our utterances 
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will be nothing more than mere recitations; we will be 'parroting' words without thought. 
Consider the case of Kamala. Was Kamala merely parroting speech when she said her 
first word? Kamala was ten years old before she said her first word- 'rna' for Mrs. Singh 
(the housekeeper at the orphanage). Even though Kamala had been exposed to human 
contact for two years was there any thought behind her first word or was she parroting 
what she had already heard? I suggest that Kamala was most likely parroting a sound that 
she had already heard. But once she was able to consistently match the word 'rna' to the 
object 'Mrs. Singh' then we may conclude that there was some thought behind her 
speech. Often there are times when what we say does not match the content of our 
thoughts resulting in parroting speech (or insincere speech- acting, lying, etc.). For 
example when I act the part of Shakespeare's Brutus I am merely parroting speech 
because I do not really intend to kill a man named Julius Caesar. 
Does Dennett's pandemonium model result in parroting speech? Rosenthal 
claims that Dennett's pandemonium model, which posits only subpersonal events of 
content fixation, produces parroting speech. For Dennett these subpersonal events of 
content fixations, which can be located in space and time, are not conscious. These 
content fixations are representations of colour, form, orientation, motion, etc. Dennett 
claims that these content fixations come together in an integrative process which involves 
dispositions (i.e. beliefs) to produce narratives or stories that are about one's mental life. 
As a result, for Dennett, there are no phenomena present on the Cartesian screen since 
there is no Cartesian screen. The content fixations and the editorial processes are not 
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conscious; only the results of them, the content of what is said, is conscious. 
Refinement Model 
Rosenthal, in direct opposition to Dennett's pandemonium model, adopts our pre-
theoretical intuitions or folk psychological view oflanguage production. Rosenthal's 
folk psychology maintains that the content of our thoughts (or intentional states) fix our 
speech acts. He claims that "our speech acts, moreover, reflect the content of those 
intentional states. It is natural to hold that this correspondence of content is exact; 
whenever we say anything, the speaker's meaning of our speech act is the same as the 
content of the intentional state we express" (Rosenthal, 2000, p. 289). It then seems from 
a first-person perspective that what we say matches exactly the content of the intentional 
states we are in. However when Rosenthal claims that our thoughts are determined prior 
to their expression in speech this forces him to rely upon our pre-theoretical intuitions 
and thus advocate some type ofbureaucracy model. Granted our speech acts would not 
be parroting because we would have full fledged intentional states prior to the verbal 
expression. But Rosenthal would then be obliged to concede that there is some type of 
language of thought or mentalese. Mentalese should be avoided because it suggests that 
there is a central meaner working behind the scenes directing the production from 
mentalese into a natural language. As mentioned in Chapter 1 both Dennett and 
Rosenthal want to avoid such Cartesian notions. 
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How then does Rosenthal claim to solve the problem of non parroting speech 
while avoiding the problem ofmentalese? Rosenthal advocates a position that combines 
the pandemonium model with our folk psychological intuitions to form the 'refinement 
model'. Rosenthal (2000) claims that "the folk-psychological model arguably 
exaggerates the match in content between speech act and intentional state, and the 
pandemonium model provides a useful corrective" (p. 293). For Rosenthal there is some 
matching of content and speech act but this is not always an exact match. He argues that 
the content of a particular thought can be expressed equally well in a range of speech acts. 
For example I may have the thought 'I am cold' and I may express that thought by saying 
'I am cold', 'it is freezing', 'I am shivering', 'there is a chill in the air', 'the wind is icy 
cold today', and the list goes on. Rosenthal regards the content of the thought as neutral 
in respect to the multiple meanings ofthe various speech acts. He claims "[a]ny 
particular choice of words, then, produces a speech act with semantic meaning more fine 
grained than the content of the corresponding intentional state" (p. 294 ). The various 
speech acts are more fine-grained than the content of the thought thus our speech acts can 
go beyond the content of our thoughts. As a result the folk-psychological claim that the 
content of our thoughts exactly matches our speech acts does not hold true. Thus, 
according to Rosenthal, under the refinement model we can have non parroting speech 
that avoids some type of mentalese. Rosenthal describes his refinement model in the 
following way: 
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[T]he refinement model ... avoids the disadvantages ofboth the folk-
psychological and pandemonium models, by allowing us to explain the difference 
between parroting and nonparroting speech performance while circumventing the 
temptation to hypothesize a full-fledged language of thought. The refinement 
model shares with the pandemonium model the recognition that speech often 
outstrips our thoughts in content. But unlike the pandemonium model, the 
refinement model preserves both our folk-psychological taxonomy and the 
traditional view that speech acts express antecedent intentional states. (p. 295) 
Rosenthal unfairly criticizes Dennett's pandemonium model for advocating parroting 
speech. To suggest that Dennett's pandemonium model produces parroting speech is to 
imply that someone or something, possibly a central meaner, is behind the initial speech 
act. Dennett's pandemonium model does not involve mere recitations but involves an 
integrative process that allows for meaning to be generated without relying upon the 
existence of a central meaner. Could the refinement model, by holding on to our folk-
psychological notions, be unknowingly positing a Cartesian central meaner? If so the 
refinement model may not be doing away with mentalese or parroting speech as 
Rosenthal suggests. Rosenthal's refinement model specifically refers to an initial 
intentional state, even though it may be vaguer and less fine-grained than the language it 
expresses. This vague intentional state will still require a vague mentalese and a vague 
central meaner. Rosenthal may make the initial intentional state less fine-grained but this 
does not solve the problems of a central meaner or mentalese. Rosenthal continues to 
posit an initial intentional state, albeit a less fine-grained one. Here we can see how 
Rosenthal has fallen victim to his own folk psychology. In his eagerness to hold on to 
our pre-theoretical intuitions he posits an initial intentional state which results in the 
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introduction of a central meaner. The best way to avoid the notion of a Cartesian central 
meaner is to side with Dennett when he claims that our speech acts fix the content of our 
thoughts (or intentional states). 
Dennett ultimately rejects attempts by Rosenthal to align his theory of 
consciousness (HOT theory and refinement model) with his own theory of consciousness 
(MDM and pandemonium model). Dennett claims that Rosenthal's hierarchy ofhigher-
order thoughts presents a cause for concern. Remember that for Rosenthal consciousness 
is a relational property (i.e. the property ofbeing accompanied by higher-order thoughts) 
thus for Rosenthal (1986) "[t]he appearance ofmental states will not, therefore, 
automatically coincide with their reality" (p. 19). There is the chance then, within the 
hierarchy ofhigher-order thoughts, that an error in memory will occur. Dennett (199la) 
points out that "if the experience you are reporting is a past experience, your memory - on 
which you rely in your report - might be contaminated by error" (p. 318). We may want 
to ask: if error can occur within Rosenthal's hierarchy of higher-order thoughts can we 
collapse this chain into a flattened world where how things seem to us is actually what we 
experience? Dennett is quick to point out that, in this sense, a flattened world is a 
Cartesian notion. For Descartes the way we experience the world is the way the world 
seems to us. For example ifl experience a 'red sunset' then there must be a real 'red 
sunset' in the world for all to see. In a flattened world the occurrence of the mental state 
'I see a red sunset' must correspond to a real red sunset present before me, presumably on 
the screen in the Cartesian theatre. Thus for Descartes what we experience coincides with 
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a mental reality (i.e. the idea on the Cartesian screen). As mentioned in Chapter 1 
consciousness, for Descartes, is an intrinsic property. Dennett does not espouse this 
Cartesian view of consciousness where mental states coincide with reality. For Dennett 
there is only content and vehicle and thus no mental reality independent of our 
heterophenomenological reports about the real world. Dennett points out that it makes no 
sense to make a distinction between how an event seems and how that same event is 
really experienced by us. Dennett claims that the notion of real seemings is incoherent. 
"There is no such phenomenon as really seeming - over and above the phenomenon of 
judging in one way or another that something is the case" (p. 364). Dennett does not 
deny that various things seem to have various features but what he does deny is that in 
addition to an event appearing that there is another mental reality of that same event. 
Dennett wants to avoid a duplicate world since there is only one real physical world. 
Thus for Dennett there is no mental reality separate from our heterophenomenological 
reports about the real world. 
We can illustrate Detmett's point, that there is no mental reality separate from our 
heterophenomenological reports about the real world. if we consider how our brains deal 
with wallpaper. Dennett supposes that we walk into a room where the wallpaper is a 
regular array ofhundreds of identical images ofMarilyn Monroe. We know that the 
highest resolution of our visual field normally occurs directly in front of our head and 
eyes but as we move further away from the center of our visual fields into our parafoveal 
\·ision the resolution quality deteriorates. Even given the fact that we have poor 
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parafoveal vision we 'instantly' recognize that there are hundreds of identical images of 
Marilyn Monroe. We can arrive at this conclusion even ifwe do not examine each 
individual image to see if it is identical with the last. How is this possible? Dennett 
(1991a) suggests that our brains "having identified a single Marilyn, and having received 
no information to the effect that the other blobs are not Marilyns, it jumps to the 
conclusion that the rest are Marilyns, and labels the whole region 'more Marilyns' 
without any further rendering of Marilyn at all" (p. 355). However it does not seem that 
way to us; it actually seems as if we are seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns. Even 
though we are seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns it is not the case that there are 
hundreds of identical Marilyns represented in our brains. Dennett argues that "[y ]our 
brain just somehow represents that there are hundreds of identical Marilyns, and no 
matter how vivid your impression is that you see all that detaiL the detail is in the world, 
not in your head. And no figment gets used up in rendering the seeming, for the seeming 
isn't rendered at all ... " (p. 355). This point demonstrates that we should not think about 
the world as how it seems to seem and how it really seems; there is no objectively 
subjective. If we were to claim that there is (1) the way the world seems to seem, and (2) 
the way the world really seems, we would be advocating Cartesian materialism (i.e. the 
notion of a mental reality on a Cartesian screen). As mentioned in Chapter I Dennett 
wants to avoid such a Cartesian notion, thus for Dennett there remains no mental reality 
separate from our heterophenomenological reports about the real world. 
Dennett's basic idea behind his multiple drafts model and the pandemonium 
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model has been refe1Ted to as 'fame in the brain'. He acknowledges that consciousness is 
not exactzv like fame in the brain because fame is something that is nmmally given or 
supplied. Consciousness is more like influence, a branch of fame, because it is something 
that is appropriated; it is like 'influence in the brain'. Dennett claims that consciousness, 
for Rosenthal, is something that is given or supplied (i.e. here consciousness is like a 
searchlight of attention), much like a king is able to grant some type of notoriety to his 
subjects. Dennett (2000) claims that "[t]he main difference between Rosenthal's HOT 
theory and mine, then, is that in his theory, being conscious is not like being famous; it's 
like being known by the King" (p. 376). Dennett believes that Rosenthal's view of 
consciousness is misguided. Dennett argues that consciousness must be explained by the 
functional powers of attention-grabbing as opposed to attention-giving sources. Dennett 
accuses Rosenthal of holding onto the Cartesian notion of a central meaner where in 
Content. Interpretation, and Consciousness Rosenthal's use ofthe term 'we' reveals that 
he does posit a central meaner. Dennett suggests that "[a] word that stands out like a sore 
thumb in (my reading of) Rosenthal's essay is the pronoun 'we' ... any theory of 
consciousness with such a subject still in the picture has a hostage: until it is discharged. 
we can't tell ifthere has been any real progress" (p. 378). 
Public Language 
Dennett's pandemonium model proves to be a better way of explaining the nature 
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oflanguage production than Rosenthal's refinement model. Do Rosenthal's refinement 
model and Dennett's pandemonium model reveal anything further about the nature of 
language? What do their respective theories have to say about a 'public language'? A 
public language stands in opposition to a 'private language'. A private language is a 
language that contains elements which are logically impossible for anyone but the speaker 
to learn and understand. The philosophy of Jerry Fodor is representative of a thinker who 
explicitly argues for a private language. A public language, in contrast, is then a 
language that contains elements that are logically possible to learn and understand. A 
public language requires a public arena where language must take place. This public 
arena is essentially the human cultural milieu in which our language has developed; it 
consists of our parents, care-takers, siblings, friends, teachers, and basically all those who 
are around us and interact with us. It is from those around us that we are first exposed to 
language and it is from those around us that we learn to speak. Rosenthal's refinement 
model does not imply a public language because he does not require a public arena where 
language takes place. Language, for Rosenthal, is produced prior to our verbal 
expressions. Remember that Rosenthal's folk psychology maintains that the content of 
our thoughts (or intentional states) fix our speech acts. Thus Rosenthal's refinement 
model does not imply a public language. 
Dennett's pandemonium model of language production and heterophenomological 
method of discovery reveal an essential feature of language. We know that language is 
produced unconsciously and we know that Dennett's method is intrinsically linguistic. 
47 
Thus when we verbally report on the contents of our heterophenomenological worlds our 
reports, which were produced unconsciously, come to reside in a public arena. We now 
arrive at the conclusion that Dennett's pandemonium model posits the existence of some 
type of public arena where language must take place. That is to say that Dennett is 
presenting an anti-private language argument by requiring a public arena where our 
unconsciously produced reports interact and play. Consider once again the case of 
Kamala and Amala; would they have developed a language if they remained in isolation 
from human contact? It is difficult to know what would have happened but the essential 
foundations for the development of language were present. In particular there was at least 
two participants, Kamala and Amala, both with the potential to develop a language. 
What remains to be seen is whether Kamala was past the critical age for language 
development (possibly age four or five) as it seems current child psychology suggests. In 
that case Kamala and Amala may not have developed a language if they remained in 
isolation from human contact. 
Dennett's heterophenomenological method requires that there exists some public 
arena where language takes place and hence implies an anti-private language argument. 
Dennett requires that there is at least one individual that issues reports about his/her 
heterophenomenological world and at least one other individual that interprets those 
reports. Remember from Chapter 1 that heterophenomenology refers to the description of 
objects ofhuman experience which is undertaken by another. Thus Dennett's method 
requires a first-person reporter (or experiencer) and a third-person interpreter (or 
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observer). Is it possible to do without a third-person interpreter? Can one individual both 
issue reports and interpret them? We often 'talk to ourselves' all the time thereby acting 
as both reporter and interpreter. For example we talk to ourselves saying things like 'It 
may rain today so I better not forget my umbrella' or 'I have to remember to pick-up the 
dry-cleaning on my way home from work'. This is true but it is true only because we 
have previously come to realize that there exists a public arena where language takes 
place. Since we have already learned a language we can get away with this type of 
description but if we had not already learned a language we would be unable to describe 
our heterophenomenological worlds to ourselves or a third-person interpreter. Thus 
Dennett's method must involve a third-person interpreter and first-person reporter. Since 
Dennett's method relies upon the interpretation ofthe language of first-person reporters 
by third-person interpreters than his heterophenomenological method is intrinsically 
linguistic and implies an anti-private language argument. 
Dennett acknowledges the influence that Ludwig Wittgenstein had upon his 
philosophical thinking. Thus ifwe briefly outline \Vittgenstein's (1953) anti-private 
language argument in his work Philosophicall!zvesrigations we may better understand 
the roots ofDennett's thinking about language. Wittgenstein argues that to use a 
language is to do something correctly or incorrectly. We must therefore be able to check. 
at least in principle, that one is doing it correctly. Can a language contain elements that 
only the speaker can learn and understand? No! A private language would not allow for 
one to check if he or she were correct. Therefore language must be something that is 
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public and accessible to those who have the capacity to participate in a language. 
Language then requires a minimum of two individuals in order to give objects common 
meanings. Ifwe return to the example of Kamala and Amala we quickly realize that 
Kamala, on her own, would have no hope of developing a language if there are no other 
humans to create a public arena in which language can take place. Given this public 
nature of language and that fact that language is related to consciousness, consciousness 
must also have a public nature. Therefore without a community to create a public arena 
where language must take place an individual could not become or be conscious. 
Dennett's pandemonium model, heterophenomenological method, and the 
implication that language requires a public arena play an important role in understanding 
his theory of consciousness. In this chapter I have highlighted the importance of 
language to Dennett's theory of consciousness. As we have discussed language is a 
method of communication that requires syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Animals, who 
do not possess a language, can only communicate by way of signalling. The key 
difference between language and signalling is that signalling does not have a syntax while 
language does. Thus we can attribute meanings and beliefs and desires (via the 
intentional stance) to the verbal utterances of non-linguistic animals but not necessarily 
consciOusness. We may now begin to see that language is intimately connected with 
consciOusness. Language, which is unique to human beings, is produced unconsciously 
hence providing the advantage of avoiding mentalese and parroting speech. Rosenthal's 
refinement model maintains that it is our intentional states that fix our speech acts thereby 
50 
positing some type of mentalese. Since Rosenthal clings too tightly to our pre-theoretical 
intuitions he cannot escape the Cartesian notion of a central meaner. Thus Dennett's 
pandemonium model serves as a better way of accounting for the production of language 
than Rosenthal's refinement model. As the better model of language production, 
Dennett's pandemonium model implies that there is a public arena where language must 
take place. Since language has a public nature and we know the important role language 
plays in Dennett's theory of consciousness, consciousness must also have a public nature. 
Consequently for an individual to be conscious or to become conscious there must also be 
a public arena where consciousness can occur. We must now attempt to understand what 
is required for consciousness. In the next chapter we will need to explore in further detail 
the relationship between language and consciousness. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter focused upon language. In particular I made a distinction between two 
methods of communication: language and signalling. Language is unique ro the normal 
human mind, it is something that animals cannot develop. Dennert ·s pandemonium 
model claims that language is produced unconscious('.· 1vhich atjirst glance appears vel~1" 
counter-intuitive. However Dennett's model has the advantage o_(avoiding mentalese 
and non-parroting speech. Rosenthal unsuccessfulf.v attempts to combine his folk 
psychology with Dennett's pandemonium model. Dennett's pandemonium model posits 
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an anti-private language argument and as a consequence requires a public arena where 
language must take place. As we learned in Chapter 1 Dennett's method is intrinsically 
linguistic, combined with his pandemonium model of language production the 
relationship between language and consciousness appears to be growing stronger. We 
will now need to explore that relationship further in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 
The main thrust of the next chapter will be to examine the relationship between language 
and consciousness. f will explore Rosenthal's distinction between 'creature 
consciousness ' and 'state consciousness ' and how they are intertvvined in our everyday 
understanding of consciousness. I will inquire, using Rosenthal's distinction of 
'reporting' and 'expressing', about what makes a mental state consciousness. I will 
outline Rosenthal's failed attempts ro do away with Dennett's first-person 
operationalism. In doing so Rosenthal actually ends up discrediting his own theory by 
opening the door to the Cartesian notion of a finish line for consciousness. And final~v I 
H'ill conclude by arguing that language is indeed requiredfor consciousness. 
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Chapter 3 - Relationship Between Language and Consciousness 
Creature and State Consciousness 
Consciousness is a word that has a variety of different meanings. We can roughly 
classify consciousness into two senses: a social sense and a psychological (or mental) 
sense. In the social sense consciousness means the joint or mutual knowledge shared by a 
community of people. In Marxist thought the social sense of consciousness is used when 
referring to a 'class consciousness'. In the psychological sense consciousness relates to 
individuals, rather than to groups, and contains no political overtones. The psychological 
sense of consciousness can be subdivided once again into two uses: a transitive usage and 
an intransitive usage. The transitive usage of consciousness refers to being conscious of 
something. Transitive consciousness then requires a direct object or an intentional 
component. Rosenthal ( 1990b) claims that "[ o ]ne is transitively conscious of something 
if one is in a mental state whose content pertains to that thing - a thought about the thing, 
or a sensation of it" (p. 737). The intransitive usage of consciousness, in contrast. refers 
merely to being conscious. Intransitive consciousness does not require a direct object or 
an intentional component; it refers to a feature a mental state has when I am aware of it. 
Rosenthal claims that "'(t]his intransitive use figures only when talking about mental 
states" (p. 73 7). This thesis is then concerned only with the psychological sense of 
consciOusness. 
Rosenthal identifies two types of consciousness: creature and state consciousness. 
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He points out that in colloquial terms these two types of consciousness are often run 
together, that is we nom1ally do not make a distinction between the two. This can cause 
problems when attempting to discover the true nature of consciousness therefore we 
must, Rosenthal maintains, distinguish between creature and state consciousness. For 
Rosenthal creature consciousness simply involves a person or creature being awake and 
sentient. This type of consciousness is very broad and encompasses most living entities 
(i.e. such as humans and animals); it essentially involves the ability to be in a particular 
mental state. On the other hand inanimate objects, such as rocks, are excluded because 
they are not awake or capable of feeling. In addition an entity will not be creature 
conscious if it is in a deep coma or in non-REM sleep. Creature consciousness is then a 
property of an entity since it denotes an overall state that an entity is in. Rosenthal points 
out that his theory of consciousness is primarily concemed with state consciousness and 
not creature consciousness. For Rosenthal state consciousness is a property of mental 
states (not entities); it functions as a type-identifier for mental states. State consciousness 
occurs when we are aware of a particular mental state and that mental state is a conscious 
state. Rosenthal (1990b) claims that "[ s ]ince only conscious creatures can be in 
conscious states. but the mental states of a conscious creature may not all be conscious 
states, state consciousness presupposes creature consciousness" (p. 731 ). When 
Rosenthal speaks of a conscious mental state (accompanied by a suitable higher-order 
thought) he is referring to state consciousness. Rosenthal argues that some mental states 
are about things (transitive usage) and these may or may not be state conscious 
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(intransitive usage), that is, I may or may not be aware of them. Ifi am aware of them, 
they are intransitively conscious. Both the transitive and intransitive uses of 
consciousness are features of mental states, never creatures. Thus creature consciousness 
is an attribute predicated of entities while state consciousness is predicated of mental 
states. When I refer to the terms 'entity' and 'being' I understand that an entity or being 
is creature conscious if at least one of its' mental states is state conscious. Thus an entity 
is creature conscious just in case it has at least one mental state that is state conscious 
(Rosenthal, 1990b, pp. 729-731 ). 
Expressing and Reporting 
We can now see that it is consciousness only in the sense of 'state consciousness' 
that Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is intended to explain. But now we need to 
ask how you can know that I am in a mental state that is 'state conscious'. What makes a 
mental state conscious? Does expressing and/or reporting a mental state make it 
conscious? This section will then explore the role 'expressing' and 'reporting' plays in 
Rosenthal's theory of consciousness. For Rosenthal expressing is our ability to verbalize 
a particular mental state that \Ye are in. For example when I say "It's raining' (p) I am 
expressing the mental state that has the content 'it is raining·. Rosenthal ( 1990a) argues 
that "most verbal expressing of intentional states is not at all deliberate, but occurs 
without any conscious focus on the thought we express" (p. 3). For Rosenthal reporting 
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is our ability to describe a particular mental state that we are in. For example when I say 
'I think it's raining' (I think p) I am reporting on my mental state 'it is raining' .5 
Rosenthal argues that if we can report on a mental state it must necessarily be 
accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought and therefore be a conscious state (p. 8). 
We can express a mental state that is not conscious but when we report on that same 
mental state that particular mental state becomes state conscious. 
It seems strange for Rosenthal to claim that verbally expressing a mental state will 
not result in consciousness while reporting a mental state will result in consciousness. In 
our everyday terms it seems that whether we express or report a particular mental state we 
are aware of that mental state. Clearly when we say 'It's raining' (p) we are verbalizing 
the mental state that has the content 'it is raining'. How then can this expression not be 
conscious? The fact that we verbalize the expression must mean that we are aware of 
what we have just said. We may now wish to reject Rosenthal's distinction between 
reporting and expressing. Surely Rosenthal must be mistaken when he claims that 
expressions of mental states are not conscious. However Rosenthal provides us with a 
response to this objection. 
5 Rosenthal may be taking the statement 'I think p' too literally. When we 
commonly say 'I think it is raining' we are really saying that I have the he/ie.fthat it is 
raining. Even though we commonly say 'I think' we really mean 'I believe'. To say that 
'I believe it is raining' does not necessarily mean that I am reporting on a particular 
mental state. The statement 'I think p' is not colloquially taken to mean that I am 
reflecting onp. When I say 'I believe it is raining,' it is more of an expression ofmy 
mental state rather than a report about my mental state. In this context Rosenthal may be 
too preoccupied with the term 'think' and therefore takes it too literally. Dennett (1991a) 
agrees and thus interprets Rosenthal's 'I think' to mean 'I am sure' or 'I believe' (p. 308). 
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For Rosenthal there is a clear distinction between expressing and reporting but 
this distinction does not hold true in colloquial terms. In normal everyday speech the 
statements 'It's raining' and 'I think it's raining' are often interchanged. It seems that 
any speech act directs attention to thoughts that lie behind that speech act. That is to say, 
the statements 'It's raining' and 'I think it's raining' refer to the same thought or 
intentional state. In any circumstance in which it is acceptable to say one it would be 
appropriate to say the other. Since Rosenthal's philosophical distinction between 
expressing and repmting is confused in colloquial speech, reporting a mental state then 
corresponds to the expression of that same mental state. Rosenthal (1990a) argues that 
"when a speech act expresses an intentional state, the illocutionary force of the speech act 
corresponds to the mental attitude of the intentional state" (p. 4). When we verbally 
express a thought we are really reporting it; we equate the expression 'It's raining' to the 
report 'I think it's raining'. In everyday terms the two statements are interchangeable 
because we have a habit that allows us to treat the two intentional states as if they were 
the same. Rosenthal recognizes that it is a strong habitual character or linguistic habit 
that allows us to colloquially interchange 'p' with 'I thinkp'. This point allows 
Rosenthal to incorporate this everyday view in his folk psychology: 
Being able to express an intentional state verbally will also coincide with that 
state's being conscious. It is because saying that p and saying that one thinks that 
pare performance conditionally equivalent and this equivalence is second nature 
for us that verbally expressing a mental state normally suffices for that state to be 
conscious. The connection between verbally expressing intentional states and 
their being conscious seems to be built into the very nature of consciousness and 
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speech. But it is actually due to the well-entrenched, habitual character of the 
performance equivalence between saying that p and saying that one thinks that p 
(p. 1 0). 
Colloquial expressions lead us to treat only first-order reporting and expressing as the 
same. Thus we can successfully interchange 'p' with 'I thinkp' because our language 
has developed an everyday linguistic habit (or habitual character) of doing so. As a result 
of this Rosenthal claims that an act of expression implies that it is accompanied by a 
suitable higher-order thought and is thus conscious. The ability to report a mental state is 
thus the same as the ability to express the very thought posited by the higher-order 
thought theory (Rosenthal, l990b, p. 747). Since all verbally expressed first-order 
intentional states are conscious, for Rosenthal, first-order reporting and expressing go 
hand-in-hand. 
Rosenthal claims that there are three requirements for all verbally expressed 
intentional states to be conscious states. First only sincere speech acts express intentional 
states. Sincere speech consists in that which is not insincere speech. Insincere speech 
includes lying, acting, slips of the tongue, and Freudian parapraxis. These are all 
examples of insincere speech because the content of the expressed intentional states does 
not match what is actually uttered. For example. when I act the part of Shakespeare· s 
Brutus in his play Julius Caesar the words I speak have no actual thought behind them 
because they belong to a fictional character (remember from Chapter 2 that it is merely 
parroting speech). Secondly, as I have mentioned above, there is a distinction between 
expressing and reponing of intentional states. We take 'p' to be the expression of an 
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intentional state while 'I think p' to be the reporting of an intentional state. Thirdly, 
reporting is intuitively unmediated; that is, reporting never relies upon inference or 
observation. If a state is not conscious it will be unavailable to us as the topic of a sincere 
report. If we can sincerely report on an intentional state then it is a conscious state. That 
is what we mean by the intuitive immediacy of consciousness. 
Since Rosenthal allows verbally expressed thoughts to be conscious, can non-
verbally expressed thoughts also be conscious? Rosenthal (1990a) claims that verbally 
expressed thoughts differ strikingly from thoughts that are expressed non-verbally (p. 1). 
Rosenthal asks us to consider two cases where the act of taking an umbrella expresses a 
conscious thought. In the first case I deliberately and consciously take an umbrella to 
work because I think that it will rain later that day. Even though I do not verbally express 
my belief to someone, I am, in essence, reporting this belief to myself. By virtue of 
consciously taking an umbrella to work I am aware of having the thought that it may rain 
later that day. Thus this type of deliberate non-verbal action is not really non-verbal since 
I report the belief to myself, albeit not 'out loud'. In the second case I am late or 
preoccupied and automatically take an umbrella to work. In this case it appears that I 
have taken an umbrella to work without thinking. I have not been aware of the thought 
that it may rain later that day, as a result it may be an unconscious thought." Rosenthal 
6 Sigmund Freud would argue that there may be numerous unconscious thoughts 
that direct and influence our behaviour. This realm of unconscious states are precisely 
states that individuals do not believe they are in. These individuals are in states of mind 
that have not yet occurred to them. Rosenthal would not disagree with this notion since 
non-verbal expressions are not conscious. The transition (via higher-order thoughts) is a 
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argues that a non-verbal expression will not necessarily match an intentional state (p. 1 0). 
For example the non-verbal expression 'taking an umbrella' does not necessarily match 
the intentional state 'I think that it will rain later that day'. The taking of the umbrella, 
which is a non-verbal expression, could match any number of intentional states, such as 'I 
may need my umbrella to defend myself against a potential mugger'. Thus non-verbal 
expressions are not equivalent to verbal speech acts. Since non-verbal expressions do not 
necessarily match intentional states, acts expressed non-verbally are not necessarily 
conscious. Rosenthal adds that "since we have no well-entrenched habit of treating the 
non-verbal expressions of an intentional state as interchangeable with a report of that 
state, non-verbal expressions do not coincide with a state's being a conscious state" (p. 
1 0). Remember from Chapter 2 our discussion of the difference between language and 
signaling. A verbal expression entails language but a non-verbal expression performed 
without any conscious thought amounts to nothing more than a signal. Even though we 
may be able to attribute meaning to the act of taking an umbrella. non-verbal expressions 
have no syntax. In addition we can attribute multiple meanings to the act of taking an 
umbrella; that is, non-verbal expressions do not necessarily match intentional states. 
Since the act of taking an umbrella does not fom1 part of a system of language. non-
verbal expressions are not necessarily conscious. 
Rosenthal points out that there are two ·exceptions' to the generalization that all 
verbally expressed intentional states are conscious. Firstly there is no habitual character 
process of becoming conscious of first-order mental states. 
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or linguistic habit when reporting and/or expressing second-order thoughts and higher. 
There is no equivalence between 'I think it's raining' and 'I think that I think that it's 
raining' (Rosenthal, 1990a, pp. 11-12). Since we do not commonly discuss second-order 
reports and/or expressions (except maybe for philosophers) we have to hold strictly to our 
distinction between reporting and expressing in its simplest and direct form. Secondly 
verbal expressions of emotions and verbal reports of emotions do not necessarily refer to 
the same intentional state. Verbally expressed emotions normally happen by way of 
evaluative words. For example we can report that we are sad and we can also express our 
sadness by characterizing something as unfortunate. In this sense there is no second-
nature equivalence between these two speech acts (p. 12). When discussing emotions we 
have to hold strictly to our distinction between reporting and expressing. It is interesting 
to note that given Rosenthal's primordial distinction between expressing and reporting, it 
is actually the first-order case which is the exception! The emotional case, and the 
higher-order cases are actually 'regular' cases, uncontaminated by colloquial habit. 
Dennett (1991a) points out that Rosenthal's folk psychological use of reporting 
and expressing provides us with "an important clue about the source of the Cartesian 
Theater model: Our everyday folk psychology treats reporting one's own mental state on 
the model ofreporting events in the external world" (p. 306). For example. the causal 
chain for reporting may go something like this: first I observe an event in the external 
world with my eyes, then I form a belief about the event, then I fonn a thought, which I 
express in my report. In order to report a mental state to someone you must have a 
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higher-order thought which you express. In order to express that higher-order thought 
you must have some way of first 'observing' the mental state, which brings about a 
belief, whose onset is marked by the presence of the higher-order thought which is then 
expressed in your report. This causal chain mirrors the causal chain for reporting events 
in the external world. Dennett claims that "[ w ]e don't first apprehend our experience in a 
Cartesian Theater and then, on the basis of that acquired knowledge, have the ability to 
frame reports ... " (p. 315). Rather Dennett argues that consciousness occurs by the very 
process of framing the report. Thus for Dennett there is no Cartesian step-by-step causal 
chain required to produce a verbal report. Remember, from Chapter 2, Dennett's 
pandemonium model requires no central meaner directing reports to a place where 
consciousness occurs. Since there is no finish line for consciousness Dennett claims there 
are no 'facts of the matter' about what our conscious experiences are at any particular 
moment. The next section will explore further what Dennett means by 'facts of the 
matter' and how this reveals his operationalist approach toward consciousness. 
First-Person Operationalism 
Most of us have had the opportunity to experience a beautiful sunset at some point 
in our lives. Perhaps the sunset was experienced during a leisurely stroll along the beach, 
or during a mountainous camping excursion, or even during a simple BBQ with some 
good friends. There is something compelling about the way the deep reds and oranges of 
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the sun play with each other as they drift below the horizon. No matter where we are 
when we experience a sunset we all experience it as a unified event. Our experience of 
the sunset appears to be as a continuous, stable, and single event. Rosenthal ( 1995) 
claims that "[f]olk psychology conceives of consciousness as a unified phenomenon, 
which bears some essential connection to a single, unitary self. This encourages a picture 
on which consciousness occurs at a single place ... " (p. 359). As we have already 
discovered in Chapter 1 this is the myth of the Cartesian theatre which Dennett wishes to 
demolish. Dennett claims that there is no single place where consciousness occurs, there 
is no 'mind's eye' that is the finish line for consciousness. If a scientist were to probe our 
brains attempting to discover the exact moment when we became conscious of the sunset 
it would be purely arbitrary. The search for a finish line for consciousness cannot be 
realized. For Dennett there is no 'fact of the matter' about what our conscious 
experiences are at any particular moment. Facts of the matter are contrasted with 'how 
things seem to us' (we already touched on seemings in Chapter 2). Whatever moment it 
seems to me that I become conscious ofthe sunset is all there is. For Dennett there is no 
objective moment when something becomes conscious for me. a moment which is 
different from when it seemed to me to become conscious. and about which I could 
thereby be mistaken. This is Dennett's first-person operationalism. 
Before we can ask what Dennett's first-person operationalism is we must ask 
what is meant by the term operationalism? Operationalism is a moYement in the 
philosophy of science. stemming from Percy Bridgman's (1927) The Logic of Modern 
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Physics. Operationalism has to do with the meaningfulness of scientific concepts. 
Operationalism focuses upon scientific concepts seeking to safeguard them against 
meaninglessness by defining them solely with reference to precisely defined experimental 
operations. Bridgm<m claimed that scientific concepts must be defined in terms of the 
operations employed in applying them (i.e. 'length' can be defined in terms of techniques 
ofmeasurement). For example ifyou desired to discover 'the length of a table' you may 
say that it is the number of times a ruler needs to be placed end to end on the table, going 
from one end to the other. Ifthere is more than one way to measure the table, such as 
measuring the temperature of the table by placing a thermometer on the table, then we 
must specify what type of measurement is desired since measuring by temperature is not 
translatable into measures of length. Whether we use a ruler or a thermometer each 
makes sense only in terms ofthe mode ofmeasurement involved. Furthermore questions 
which cannot be decisively answered with reference to operations are banned from 
science. Dennett is not an operationalist in general, however he is a operationalist when 
it comes to consciousness. Dennett advocates a weaker version of operationalism, which 
applies only to facts about conscious experience which Dennett refers to as tirst-person 
operationalism. What then is first-person operationalism? First-person operationalism 
refers to the denial that there is any fact of the matter about whether certain stimuli reach 
consciousness and about what conscious experiences are at any particular moment, over 
and beyond how it seems to me. Dennett (1991a) claims that "there is no reality of 
consciousness independent of the effects of various vehicles of content on subsequent 
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action'' (p. 132). As a result "there are no fixed facts about the stream of consciousness 
independent of particular probes" (p. 138). Dennett claims that first-person 
operationalism avoids the objectively subjective; the way things seem to you even if they 
don't seem to seem that way to you (i.e. as is the case with the phi phenomena, which is 
discussed in the next paragraph). Rosenthal claims that his higher-order thought theory 
can do the same job as Dennett's multiple drafts model without relying upon first-person 
operationalism. Rosenthal attempts to align his theory of consciousness with Dennett's 
theory of consciousness by doing away with Dennett's first-person operationalism. 
Exactly how does Rosenthal's theory of consciousness function without relying 
upon Dennett's first-person operationalism? Consider the example of the phi 
phenomenon. Iftwo or more small spots separated by as much as 4 degrees of visual 
angle are briefly lit in rapid succession, a single spot will seem to move. When the 
different spots are coloured the initial spot seems to begin moving and then change colour 
abruptly in the middle of its illusory passage toward the second location (i.e. subjects 
report a red spot moving location and changing colour to a green spot). The phi 
phenomenon demonstrates the existence of apparent motion and is the basis for motion 
pictures and television. Rosenthal ( 1995) claims that ''the HOT hypothesis 
accommodates the various temporal anomalies no less well then the MOM" (p. 362). 
Rosenthal argues that the initial flash of the red spot causes the mental state of a red spot 
to occur (the suitable accompanying HOT may never become conscious). The second 
flash of the green spot causes the mental state of 'a moving colour changing spot' to 
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occur. This mental state is accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought that gives us 
the conscious experience of a red spot moving and changing colour to a green spot. 
Rosenthal claims that the higher-order thought about the initial red spot may in fact occur 
so quickly and be replaced by the second HOT that it does not register mentally. 7 The 
first sensory state is then technically conscious but it occurs so briefly that it actually 
makes no mental difference at all. These examples represent Stalinesque and Orwellian 
models of memory revision. Orwellian memory revision (which Dennett named after 
George Orwell's Ministry of Truth that was responsible for rewriting history in the novel 
1984) denotes that you have a false memory of your actual experience; the initial event is 
accurately observed but then the history ofthe event is immediately rewritten. 
Stalinesque memory show trial (which Dennett named after the communist 'show trails' 
during the reign of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union) signifies that you hallucinate an 
experience and then accurately remember the hallucination; it is a show trial from the 
start. 
Dennett claims that we cannot use introspection to distinguish between Orwellian 
or Stalinesque models. Dennett is able to argue this because he claims that there is no 
finish line for consciousness; in other words there is no place where consciousness all 
7 Rosenthal seems to be advocating the existence of a HOT that does not become 
integrated into the self. He claims that this initial HOT does in fact become conscious but 
does not register itself in memory. Could Rosenthal be suggesting that we can be 
conscious without memory? Does this make Rosenthal a punctualist? Rosenthal does 
not indicate how long a HOT must endure only that a mental state will be conscious when 
accompanied by a suitable HOT. 
66 
comes together (i.e. no Cartesian Theater). Thus for Dennett there is no fact of the matter 
about whether certain stimuli reach consciousness, and so there is no real difference 
between the Orwellian and Stalinesque interpretations. HoweYer Rosenthal argues that 
his HOT theory is, in fact, able to distinguish between the two models. He claims that 
"the HOT hypothesis would do just that, since the Orwellian model in effect posits an 
initial HOT that on the Stalinesque model doesn't occur ... Explaining these phenomena 
doesn't require us to deny that there's a fact of the matter about which is operative in any 
particular case" (p. 363). Thus Rosenthal claims he can do without Dennett's first-person 
operationalism. 
However Rosenthal's argument, that he can do without Dennett's first-person 
operationalism, is not entirely satisfactory. The point of operationalism is that if there is 
in principle no perspective from which a difference could ever be discovered, the so-
called difference is then meaningless. There is no way for us to distinguish between the 
Orwellian or Stalinesque models of memory revision even though Rosenthal's HOT 
theory claims that the Orwellian model posits an initial HOT that the Stalinesque model 
does not. From a first-person perspective there is no way to detem1ine whether a process 
is Orwellian or Stalinesque thus both models are introspectively indistinguishable. Even 
non-verbal behaviour would not provide us with anything ne\v. since any reaction could 
be due equally to a conscious or unconscious reaction. Thus from a third-person 
perspective there is also no way to determine whether a process is Orwellian or 
Stalinesque. Rosenthal leaves us with an unconvincing way of aYoiding Dennett's first-
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person operationalism. Thus Dennett's first-person operationalism is required to 
understand that there are no facts of the matter about what our conscious experiences are 
at any particular moment. 
Language is Required for Consciousness 
If there are no facts of the matter about what conscious experiences are at any 
particular moment then how do we know if someone is conscious? How can I tell if I am 
conscious let alone if someone else is conscious? What is required for consciousness? 
Rosenthal ( 1990a) points out that "whenever I express my thoughts in speech, those 
thoughts are conscious thoughts" (p. 1 ). Remember that expressing or reporting a mental 
state at the first-order level is colloquially understood to correspond to the same 
intentional state. A mental state that is expressed is conscious if and only if it is 
accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought. For Rosenthal it is not the expression 
itself that makes a mental state conscious but it is the accompaniment of a higher-order 
thought that does so. This leads me to believe that language, for Rosenthal. is not a 
necessary condition for consciousness. Rosenthal requires the presence of a higher-order 
thought as a condition for consciousness whereas the ability to express a mental state is 
not a condition, even though the ability to express a mental state entails language (recall 
from Chapter 2 that any non-verbal expression amounts to signalling). My ability to 
express a thought merely lets others know the status of my mental states. Consequently 
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for Rosenthal a picture now begins to emerge that points toward the possibility that a 
higher-order thought might occur without the linguistic ability to express a mental state. 
Rosenthal hints, on a few occasions, that it is possible that non-linguistic creatures can be 
state conscious (incidentally this will also make non-linguistic animals creature 
conscious). If higher-order thoughts are possible without the ability to express and/or 
report on them, then it is possible that non-linguistic creatures can be state conscious. 
Rosenthal ( 1990b) points out in the footnotes of his essay Theory of Consciousness "this 
does not mean that the mental states of non-linguistic creatures are never conscious states 
... the fact that many mental states of non-linguistic creatures are conscious provides no 
reason to deny the connection between a state's being conscious and our ability to report 
about it" (pp. 752-753 ). Rosenthal is clearly open to the notion that it is possible that 
non-linguistic creatures can be state conscious. Rosenthal (1990a) grants that "we can 
extend the term [state consciousness] to creatures that lack the ability to report their 
mental states" even though he does not demonstrate how this can be accomplished (p. 
18). Rosenthal may simply be relying on the possibiliz1· that non-linguistic creatures can 
be state conscious. However claiming that something is possible does not demonstrate 
how it could be realized and can therefore be problematic. In addition. allowing for the 
possibility that non-linguistic animals could be state conscious violates our earlier 
distinction between language and signalling. If it were possible that non-linguistic 
animals could be state conscious then non-verbal expression would amount to more than 
signalling and animals would have a language. But since non-verbal expression does not 
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contain any syntax, non-linguistic animals cannot be state conscious. Perhaps Rosenthal 
sees this as a weakness of his folk psychology and as a result does not directly address 
this issue. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 Dennett's heterophenomenological method is 
intrinsically linguistic and this has given us a hint as to what is required for 
consciousness. Bound by Dennett's method of philosophical investigation we are 
naturally lead to a linguistic connection to consciousness. We can only verbally describe 
the contents of our heterophenomenological world if we have a public arena where 
language takes place (as already discussed in Chapter 2). Otherwise the most we can 
attribute to an entity are beliefs and desires by adopting the intentional stance. Language 
is then required for the content of my personal heterophenomenological reports. We must 
keep in mind that language is produced unconsciously. Remember from Chapter 2 that 
with Dennett's pandemonium model of language production our reports are formed 
unconsciously and not until our reports are verbalized do they become conscious. 
Dennett's method involves the interpretation of the content of our personal 
heterophenomenological reports. It is the issuing ofverbal repmis. about our 
heterophenomenological worlds, which result in what I refer to as consciousness. Thus 
language is required for the content of my personal heterophenomenological reports, in 
other words, language is required for consciousness. 
The identification of oneself as a conscious entity can only occur with the ability 
to use and understand language. Thus language is required even for me to know that I am 
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a conscious entity, since I cannot be a conscious entity without knowing it. Once I am 
able to see myself as a subject of continuing experience (i.e. a person or a self) then I will 
be able to tell a story about my life. We all know the story of our own lives because we 
tell them every single day. We tell them to our families, our friends, our co-workers, and 
even to ourselves. Once again let us consider the case of Kamala. Imagine what 
Kamala's story might sound like; 'Before I live with wolves, now I live with Mrs. Singh 
and children.' It is simple and crude but we can imagine that it is something Kamala 
might tell about herself if she were asked to tell her story. We can now refer to Kamala's 
ability to integrate her reports about her heterophenomenological world into a story about 
herself as a narrative. A narrative is a story we tell about ourselves that often occurs 
unconsciously (remember Dennett's pandemonium model of unconscious language 
production). Narrative can be seen as a fundamental tactic for human self-control and 
self-preservation. The self-protective strings of narrative we weave appear to come from 
a single source, such as a centre of narrative gravity. Centres of gravity are purely 
abstract objects (abstracrum), thus centres ofnarrative gravity can also be thought of as 
abstractions (i.e. much like beliefs. as discussed in Chapter 1 ). We may now claim that 
consciousness is the ability to weave a narrative. Consciousness comes from a single 
source (i.e. a person or a self) much like a centre of gravity is the central point where 
multiple forces act upon an object. In one sense a centre of gravity is an abstraction; it is 
not something that we can hold in the palm of our hands. And in much the same way 
consciousness is not a thing in the brain that can be isolated and dissected. 
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Language is the only way a third-person observer can determine if an entity is 
conscious and also the only way a first-person experiencer can determine if he or she is a 
conscious entity. Dennett ( 1991 a) claims "[ e ]xpressing a mental state, deliberately or 
not, is just doing something that provides good evidence for, or makes manifest, that state 
to another observer- a mind reader, if you like. Reporting a mental state, in contrast, is a 
more sophisticated activity, always intentional, and involving language" (p. 306). 
Dennett argues that it is only our ability to report on the content of our experience, via the 
structure of language, that is important. Consciousness is something more then 
expressing a mental state; it is the ability to report on a mental state. A mental state will 
become state conscious if and only if it is reported in language. Thus for Dennett 
reporting in language is essential for consciousness. Language is then an integrative 
activity or process which allows consciousness to occur. There is no 'experience' prior to 
my reporting; not until I report on the content of my heterophenomenological world am I 
conscious. Thus for Dennett it is the reporting that is consciousness. Unlike Dennett, 
Rosenthal argues that consciousness occurs when a mental state is accompanied by a 
suitable higher-order thought (remember Rosenthal's HOT theory from Chapter 1 ). For 
RosenthaL language is not a condition for consciousness since he allows for the 
possibility that a higher-order thought can occur without the ability to report or express 
that thought. I disagree with Rosenthal on this point. The ability to report in language is 
the only way we, as third-person observers and as first-person experiencers. can verify if 
an entity is conscious. Of course Descartes would argue that we do not need a third-
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person observer to confirm that we are conscious. For Descartes all that is required is the 
ability to be in a mental state (i.e. I think therefore I am) since being in a mental state is 
intrinsically the same as consciousness. As mentioned in Chapter 1 Dennett wishes to 
avoid such Cartesian notions of consciousness. Consequently, for Dennett, to be 
conscious is to possess the integrative ability to use and understand language. 
What is the integrative process of language that allows consciousness to occur? 
This integrative process involves the use of various unconscious content-fixations 
(representations of colour, form, orientation, motion, etc.). These content-fixations do 
not occur in one particular place in the brain because there is no Cartesian theatre or 
central meaner to discriminate among them. Various word-demons use these content-
fixations constructing numerous verbal utterances. These unconsciously produced verbal 
utterances emerge from a parallel, multi-track process of integration (recall Dennett's 
multiple drafts model from Chapter 1 ). These verbal utterances are performed without 
any conscious preamble. The phrases that become vocalized are the ones that are in the 
right place at the right time. The speaker gets no preview; both the audience and the 
speaker learn what is said at the same time. Our reports are formed unconsciously and 
not until our reports are verbalized do they become conscious. The language created as a 
result of this integrative process is used to produce stories or narratives about our mental 
lives. 
So if Kamala is able to use and understand language can we consider her a 
conscious being? Kamala's ability to use and understand a language would necessarily 
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entail a grasp of grammatical rules. If Kamala's verbal utterances adhered to a syntax we 
could declare that she had developed a language.8 With Kamala's ability to use and 
understand language she would be able to tell a crude story or narrative about herself. At 
this point in her life Kamala would not have had the vocabulary to understand what the 
term 'consciousness' meant but this is not immediately relevant; what is important is her 
ability to report on the content of her experiences, albeit very crudely. Once Kamala 
could produce a narrative about her life we can consider her to be a conscious being. If 
we were to teach Kamala the meaning of the term consciousness she would be able to 
recognize herself as a conscious being. Kamala would not have to know the definition of 
the term consciousness to be conscious; she would only require the ability to use and 
understand a language. 
As a result of this intimate connection between language and consciousness, the 
development of consciousness must be seen as something that evolves. The development 
of consciousness is a gradual evolutionary process; it goes hand in hand with the 
evolution and development of language. I can report the content of my 
heterophenomenological world to myself only because I have previously learned to report 
it to others. Thus I can 'talk to myself because I have already understood and 
experienced that there is a public arena where language takes place. Therefore the 
x Steven Pinker (1994) argues that during the 'critical period' of language 
acquisition children quickly learn to use syntax correctly. "A three-year-old. then, is a 
grammatical genius - master of most constructions, obeying rules far more often than 
t1outing them, respecting language universals, erring in sensible, adultlike ways, and 
avoiding many kinds of errors altogether" (p. 276). 
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development of consciousness must be seen as going hand-in-hand with the development 
of language. We know from our discussions in Chapter 1 and 2 that we can attribute 
beliefs (via the intentional stance) and meanings (the semantics of signalling) to the 
verbal howls and cries of Kamala. Prior to her removal from the wild Kamala did not 
have a public language therefore we can claim that Kamala was not conscious. However 
once Kamala developed a language, that adhered to a syntax, we could ask her to describe 
the contents of her heterophenomenological world. Her ability to describe the contents of 
her world would indicate to herself and us, as third-person observers, that she is a 
conscious being. Thus as Kamala grew and learned the skills required to participate in 
language, her development would no doubt be marked by moments of consciousness and 
non-consciousness as she learned how to communicate via language rather than by 
signalling. By the time Kamala was 14 years old (six years from the time she was 
removed from the wild) she developed a vocabulary of 30 words (January, 1926) and by 
the time she was 15 years old she had increased her vocabulary to 45 words (January, 
1927) (GeselL 1942, p. 93 ). Even with her limited vocabulary this marks an important 
time in Kamala's life because she was able to report on the content of her personal 
heterophenomenological world. In essence Kamala would be conscious because she had 
developed a language. 
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Possible Objections 
As with any philosophical theory there are going to be a number of possible 
objections therefore I will address what I think are three of the most pressing issues to my 
thesis - language is required for consciousness. First there may be an objection to the 
heterophenomenological method of philosophical discovery. Some critics may claim 'of 
course language is required for consciousness if you start with a method that is 
intrinsically linguistic'. The heterophenomenological method remains neutral with 
respect to the apparent opposition between first-person and third-person perspectives by 
taking into account the reports of first-person experiencers and the interpretation ofthose 
reports by a third-person observers. By not relying solely upon the first-person 
perspective the heterophenomenological method is an improvement over 
phenomenology. The heterophenomenological method must be intrinsically linguistic 
because there is no other way of having access to the experiences of another. But if we 
are to rely upon language as the sole marker for identifying consciousness this may lead 
critics to a related possible objection - behaviouralism. Behaviouralism, which is closely 
associated with operationalism and verificationalism, is generally understood to be the 
doctrine of reducing mental concepts to publicly observable behaviour. There are many 
types of behaviouralism (logical, methodological, radical, etc.) which all involve some 
sort of challenge to 'mental reality' and our traditional way of thinking about the mind. 
Am I advocating something that is nothing more than behaviouralism? Surely no! 
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However I do have concerns about being labelled a behaviouralist and especially about 
classifying Dennett as a behaviouralist. After reading Dennett's magnum opus 
Consciousness Explained it may be tempting to argue that he is a behaviouralist. 
However in the appendix to Consciousness Explained Dennett suggests that he is not a 
behaviouralist; in fact he denies that his work sides with any number of 'isms'. He 
explicitly denies that he is an identity theorist, or an eliminative materialist, or a 
functionalist, or a verificationalist, or an instrumentalist, and the list goes on. It may 
seem that Dennett wants to deny the existence of mental states and to some extend he 
does deny that there is a mental reality. There is then the temptation to claim that there 
are no mental states and thus only observable behaviour. Dennett attempts to slip out of 
the behaviouralist camp by quoting Wittgenstein; Dennett is quick to point out that 
Wittgenstein (1953) claims "it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally 
we don't want to deny them" (p. 103). Dennett is not denying that there are mental states 
or mental processes, remember from Chapter 1 that we can attribute mental states (i.e. 
beliefs and desires) to an entity by adopting the intentional stance. Dennett is claiming 
that there is no 'mental reality' that is separate from how things seem to me, that is, what 
I believe myself to be experiencing or the set of beliefs that make up my 
heterophenomological reports. As discussed in Chapter 2 there are no real seemings; 
there is no seeming to seem (i.e. objectively subjective). Consequently there is only our 
heterophenomenological reports about the real world. 
A second possible objection may be that I have merely given 'consciousness' a 
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new definition that does not capture our common everyday usage of the term. This is 
true, I have redefined consciousness giving it a linguistic connection but in doing so I 
have provided us with a more coherent definition of consciousness. In arguing that 
language is required for consciousness we no longer have to hold onto our folk 
psychological or common understanding of consciousness. Our common usage of the 
term consciousness is not grounded on sound philosophical argument. As a result our 
common usage of the term consciousness can be very ambiguous. Thus ifwe were to 
adopt my notion of consciousness we could avoid that ambiguity. Many terms have been 
redefined in order to provide a more precise definition. Consider the definition of the 
term 'work'. Any current high-school physics textbook will tell you that the term 'work' 
has a specific meaning. Work is done on an object whenever a force makes that object 
move. Work (W), which is measured in joules, is the result of a force (F), which is 
measured in Newtons, applied to an object multiplied by the displacement (.c,d) of that 
object. For example work is done when a car's engine makes the car accelerate, when a 
crane lifts up a steel beam, when an archer draws back a bow, and when the arrow is 
released from the bow. This technical definition ofwork does not coincide with how we 
colloquially use the tem1 work. Consider that your car is stuck in a snowbank and you 
ask some of your frit;nds to push you out. They push as hard as they can but the car does 
not move. In this case. a force is applied but no work is done because the car does not 
move. In our everyday usage your friends would certainly claim to have done a lot of 
work trying to push your car out of the snowbank. Thus we can see how a technical 
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definition of a term does not coincide with how it is used everyday. We can apply this 
analogy to the new technical definition of consciousness that I have presented. By 
adopting this new coherent and precise definition we can avoid the ambiguity present in 
our everyday usage of the term consciousness. 
A third possible objection may be that I have presented a 'circular argument'. I 
have argued that language is required for consciousness, while the method I have used to 
arrive at this conclusion is intrinsically linguistic (i.e. Dennett's heterophenomenological 
method). The supposed 'circular argument' may go something like this: (1) the only 
method we have accepted for accessing consciousness is heterophenomenology; (2) 
heterophenomenology relies exclusively on the interpretation of linguistic reports; (3) 
thus we can conclude that consciousness is linguistic in nature. We can address this 
objection by considering an analogy with Darwin's theory of natural selection (Dennett 
discusses Charles Darwin's theory in great detail in Darwin's Dangerous Idea). 
Darwin's theory of natural selection argues that successful organisms in the struggle for 
life will differ from the unsuccessful ones hence there is a natural selection of the fittest 
organisms. The organisms that survive (i.e. continue to live) are essentially the best 
suited to reproduce in whatever particular environment they find themselves. Dan\·in's 
idea of natural selection has often been referred to as 'survival ofthe fittest'. Many 
scientific theories and concepts are full of interconnected notions and Darwin's theory of 
natural selection is not immune and thus may also be accused of producing a 'circular 
argument'. The eire ular argument may go like this: (1) beings who survive are the fittest 
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(2) thus the fittest beings are those who survive. In these general terms Darwin's theory 
of natural selection appears circular in nature. The general objection that a theory is 
circular in nature is one that is not uncommon to many scientific hypotheses. However if 
we set aside this general objection and examine only particular cases this circular 
argument quickly disappears. For example, if we wish to discover whether a short-
necked giraffe or a long-necked giraffe is the fittest for survival we only need to look at 
which type actually survived. Since there are no short-necked giraffes (most likely 
because they could not reach the same viable food source as long-necked giraffes) then 
Darwin's theory of natural selection proves to be a useful tool. It allows us to claim that 
long-necked giraffes are better suited for survival then short-necked giraffes. In much the 
same way that we applied the theory ·survival of the fittest' to the particular giraffe case, 
consider the application of the thesis 'language is required for consciousness' to the 
particular case of Kamala. When Kamala develops the ability to use and understand a 
language she becomes conscious. In these particular cases there is no circularity present. 
We must therefore view such theories as pragmatic or useful tools by which we can 
understand how the world works. We must think of my thesis as a net we throw over the 
world in order to analysis it. My thesis then stands as a pragmatic way of explaining 
consciOusness. 
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Chapter 3 
This chapter focused upon the relationship between language and consciousness. 
Rosenthal illustrated how creature consciousness and state consciousness are often . 
intertwined in our everyday usage and understanding. This chapter explored how 
Rosenthal's notion qf reporting and expressing of mental states still has not done away 
with the Cartesian notions of consciousness. Rosenthal by attempting to do away with 
Dennett's first-person operationalism actually discredits his own theory by opening the 
door to the Cartesian notion of a finish line for consciousness. Based upon Dennett's 
heterophenomenological method and pandemonium model of language production we 
must arrive at the conclusion that consciousness has a linguistic connection. Final(v this 
chapter concluded with the main thrust of my argument by claiming that language is 
required for consciousness. 
81 
Conclusion 
My thesis has arrived at the conclusion that language is required for 
consciousness. As a result of my view of consciousness a number of interesting 
implications emerge. Clearly normal human beings who can use and understand 
language can be considered conscious entities. If you are reading this sentence 
congratulations you are a conscious entity! This view of consciousness includes deaf and 
hearing impaired individuals. I take 'sign language' to be exactly what it is- a non-
verbal language. Sign language has a generative syntax into which meanings can be 
plugged. Therefore deaf individuals who have developed the use and understanding of 
sign language must be considered conscious entities. This view of consciousness does 
not necessarily exclude individuals who have suffered from a stroke. Stroke victims may 
lose their ability to speak but not their ability to understand language. This view includes 
aliens or extra-terrestrial entities provided they have developed a language with a set of 
grammatical rules and meanings. It also includes any artificial intelligence programs that 
have learned how to communicate by way of a language. If a computer can use and 
understand a language and not merely parrot words or give signals then we should 
consider it to be a conscious entity. However, on the other hand. this view of 
consciousness excludes a number of individuals. This view of consciousness excludes 
animals, fetuses, and infants; it essentially excludes all those who do not possess the 
ability to understand language. Those with autism (if they lack the ability to understand 
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language) would not be conscious. Consciousness, as I have defined it, may be an 
impossible task in virtue of the nature of autism. Individuals who are born with brain 
injuries that prevent them from developing a language would not be considered 
conscious. Feral or wild children who continue to remain in isolation from human 
contact and do not develop a language cannot be regarded as conscious entities. 
Since consciousness and language go hand-in-hand, consciousness is something 
that appears to come and go with language. We, as entities, can all 'experience' moments 
of non-consciousness, when we are in non-REM sleep or if we are in a deep coma we are 
not conscious. Remember, from Chapter 3, that I defined the term 'entity' as creature 
conscious if at least one of its mental states is state conscious. Therefore when we are in 
non-REM sleep or a deep coma we are not aware of being in a mental state; we cannot 
have a mental state that is state conscious. However when we emerge from non-REM 
sleep or a deep coma we return to a mental state that is state conscious. Amnesia victims, 
as long as they do not lose their ability to understand language, would remain conscious. 
Even if an amnesia sufferer did lose the ability to understand language (i.e. returning to a 
infant-like state), it may still be possible for him to re-learn language and thereby return 
to a state of consciousness. If consciousness is something that grows and develops then it 
is also possible that consciousness is something that shrinks and withers. This is most 
likely to occur in the later stages of life, if at all. For example for those who suffer from 
Alzheimer's or dementia there may be the possibility of losing their consciousness if they 
lose their ability to understand language. Thus consciousness, like language, is 
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something that is fluid and dynamic; consciousness and language are intimately 
connected. 
In the first chapter I discussed how both Dennett and Rosenthal advocate the 
dissolution of traditional Cartesian notions of consciousness. I introduced Rosenthal's 
higher-order thought theory and Dennett's multiple drafts model, 
heterophenomenological method, and intentional stance. Both Dennett and Rosenthal 
believe that their respective theories provide for a better alternative than the traditional 
Cartesian notions of consciousness. Dennett's intentional stance provides us with a 
powerful strategy for interpreting behaviour. It allows us to attribute a mental life to an 
entity without attributing consciousness to that same entity. Dennett's intrinsically 
linguistic method gave us a hint as to what to explore next. 
In the second chapter I focused upon language. In particular I argued that 
language, which is different from signalling, is unique to the normal human mind. We 
carmot consider animal signalling a language; even though animal signalling does have 
semantics, it lacks a syntax. I then asked the question: how is language produced? 
Dennett's pandemonium model claimed that language is produced unconsciously thus 
removing our reliance upon our folk psychological intuitions. I demonstrated how 
Rosenthal unsuccessfully attempts to combine his folk psychology with Dennett's 
pandemonium model. Dennett's pandemonium model posits an anti-private language 
argument and as a consequence requires a public arena where language must take place. 
In the third chapter I explored the relationship between language and 
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consciOusness. I presented how Rosenthal believes that creature consciousness and state 
consciousness are often intertwined in our everyday understanding of consciousness. 
Rosenthal's notion of expressing and reporting demonstrates how verbally expressed 
states can be conscious. But Dennett argues that Rosenthal's structure for expressing and 
reporting reveals that Rosenthal is still haunted by Cartesian ghosts. Dennett's first-
person operationalism allowed us to claim that there are no facts of the matter about when 
a object reaches consciousness. Language is then the only way a third-person observer 
can tell if an entity is conscious. Language is also the only way a first-person experiencer 
can tell if he or she is a conscious entity. Thus language is required for consciousness. 
The thrust of my argument has been - language is required for consciousness. I 
have examined Dennett's and Rosenthal's theories of consciousness only to discover that 
Rosenthal's folk psychology still clings to traditional Cartesian notions of consciousness. 
Consequently I have provided a more coherent understanding of consciousness that 
allows us to cast out these Cartesian ghosts that have haunted our traditional notions of 
consciousness for hundreds of years. The prevalent images of a 'mind's eye' and a 
'Cartesian theatre' no longer have a supernatural grasp upon our ne\v thinking about 
consciousness. Our new view of consciousness is then grounded upon a sound method of 
philosophical investigation. one that takes into account the first-person and third-person 
perspectives that are a cause for concern to other theories of consciousness. Therefore we 
must look to Dennett for a better way of explaining consciousness. We cannot fault 
Rosenthal for seeing the merit of Dennett's argument and attempting to incorporate his 
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folk psychology with Dennett's theory of consciousness. However Rosenthal ultimately 
fails in attempting to provide us with a coherent combined theory of consciousness 
because he does not fully exorcise his Cartesian ghosts. Dennett's theory of 
consciousness then provides us with an improved way of separating out the term 'mental' 
from the term 'consciousness'. lfwe follow the intentional stance we can interpret the 
actions of an entity by treating it as a rational agent whose behaviour is governed by 
intentional states. Thus we can attribute beliefs and desires to an entity without yet 
attributing consciousness to that same entity. Following from Dennett's 
heterophenomenological method we gain the sense that Dennett is leading us toward a 
linguistic connection to consciousness. Language, as a method of communication, is 
different from signalling. Animals can only signal but humans can both signal and use 
language; language is then unique to human beings. Even though signalling entails a 
semantics, it does not contain a syntax. Thus we can attribute meanings and beliefs (via 
the intentional stance) to the verbal utterances ofnon-linguistic creatures. Dennett's 
pandemonium model of language production declares that language is produced 
unconsciously. Dennett's method implies that language must occur in a public arena. 
Since language and consciousness are connected concepts and language has a public 
nature, consciousness must also have a public nature. Rosenthal claims that there is a 
distinction between expressing and reporting even if this distinction does not hold true in 
colloquial terms. Rosenthal's distinction between expressing and reporting demonstrates 
once again that he has not fully exorcised his Cartesian ghosts. Dennett argues that 
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Rosenthal's HOT theory is cause for concern because it allows for a causal chain where 
error may enter. This prompts Dennett to claim that there are no facts of the matter about 
what our conscious experiences are at any particular moment. Therefore only Dennett's 
MDM, pandemonium model, and heterophenomenological method provide us with the 
best way to explain consciousness. We are left with the conclusion that consciousness 
entails the ability to use and understand language. Thus the ability to use and understand 
a language is the only way we, as third-person observers and as first-person experiencers, 
can verify if an entity is conscious. This new way oflooking at consciousness can be 
likened to a net that is cast onto the world; it is a pragmatic tool for examining 
consciOusness. 
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